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I. INTRODUCTION
"[W]e are spectators of our history without being able to do anything ...
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We have no voice. That hurts a lot."' For over a century, residents of the United
States' "unincorporated" territories have grappled with their role as "spectators"
to sweeping federal congressional power over their lands and lives. From voting
to citizenship, from public benefits to rights to trial by jury, territorial peoples'
experiences diverge sharply from those living in the states.2 The doctrine of the
Insular Cases-a key part of this colonial history-provides the constitutional
justification for this disparity.' Pursuant to the Insular Cases, Congress freely
chooses which portions of the Constitution apply in the unincorporated
territories, limited only by vaguely defined "fundamental" rights.' Today,
largely viewed by courts through a formalist, ahistorical lens, and devoid of
racial reality,' the Insular Cases still shape the colonial experience of millions of
territorial peoples in the United States. And in the context of increasingly violent
storms and humanitarian crises in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands,6
alongside the looming threat of nuclear war in Guam,' these colonial burdens
intensify.
Puerto Rico's debt crisis is visible evidence of this lasting colonial
relationship. For a few short blips in the summer 2016 news cycle, Americans
learned that a new federal fiscal control board would take over Puerto Rico's
power to negotiate with creditors, decide which projects would be funded,
approve budgets, and veto debt issuances, among other changes-without regard
'Mireya Navarro, A Sad Homecoming to Puerto Rico's Economic Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (July 21,
2016), https://lens.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/07/2 1/a-sad-homecoming-to-puerto-ricos-economic-
crisis (quoting Puerto Rican resident Erika P. Rodriguez).
2 See infra Part II.
See Ediberto RomAn & Theron Simmons, Membership Denied: Subordination and Subjugation
Under United States Expansionism, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 462-63 (2002); Juan Torruella, The
Insular Cases: The Establishment ofa Regime ofPolitical Apartheid, 77 REV. JURiDICA U. P.R. 1,6-
7 (2008); Efr6n Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction ofAmerican Colonialism: The Insular Cases
(1901-1922), 65 REV. JURIDICA U. P.R. 225, 228 (1996).
See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 290-91 (1901); see infra Part II.
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (describing the relevance of the Insular Cases
without acknowledging their application to or impact on today's territorial "possessions" or
peoples); Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2016) (briefly citing to one of the
Insular Cases in passing but failing to articulate its historical context); Igarttia-de la Rosa v. United
States, 417 F.3d 145, 147 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing the Insular Cases for the sanitized
statement that "Puerto Rico became associated with the United States as an unincorporated
territory").
6 See John Nichols, Hurricane-Ravaged Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands Are Part of the US Too,
NATION (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/hurricane-ravaged-puerto-rico-and-the-
virgin-islands-are-part-of-the-us-too; Steven Cohen, How Hurricane Maria Could Change Puerto
Rico's Political Future, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 3, 2017), https://newrepublic.com/article/145133/
hurricane-maria-change-puerto-ricos-political-future
7 See Julian Aguon, When You Live in a Colony, You Are Easy Meat: Guam in the Crosshairs of
Warmongering, IN THESE TIMES (Aug. 21, 2017), http://inthesetimes.com/article/20439/Guam-
United-States-North-Korea-Donald-Trump-Colonization; Joseph Hincks, Guam Before the Storm:
Life on the Island Caught Between Trump and Kim, TIME (Aug. 17, 2017), http://time.com/
4894953/guam-north-korea-trump-missiles.
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to the wishes of Puerto Rico's leaders or people.' Now, in 2017, the media tells
us that we "can't ignore" Puerto Rico's "bankruptcy" because it may impact
Americans' retirement investments, interfere with states' ability to borrow,
throw the U.S. bond market into turmoil, or intensify Puerto Rican migration to
the continental United States."o But the underlying reasons for this "blatant
colonialism"" or new "colonial takeover"l2 of Puerto Rico's fiscal decision-
making power are likely lost on the American public. In essence, because Puerto
Rico is not a state, it cannot access Chapter 9 bankruptcy protections. At the
same time, because it is a "State," it has no right to devise its own mechanism
for restructuring its soaring debt.'I
Other controversies rooted in the Insular Cases fly even further under the
radar. Guam is deploying the Insular Cases to stave off a reverse discrimination
lawsuit by a white resident alleging that the territory unlawfully prohibited him
from registering for a political status plebiscite reserved for "Native Inhabitants
of Guam."4 The government of American Samoa and American Samoans living
in the continental United States recently sparred over whether birthright U.S.
citizenship under the Citizenship Clause is a "fundamental" right for territorial
residents." In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court proclaimed that while Puerto Rico
"has a distinctive, indeed exceptional, status as a self-governing
8 Gillian B. White, Puerto Rico's Problems Go Way Beyond Its Debt, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/puerto-rico-promesa-debt/489797.
9 See Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), Pub. L. No.
114-187, 30 Stat. 549 (2016) (codified in scattered sections of 48 U.S.C.). On May 3, 2017, the
federal fiscal oversight board filed for bankruptcy-like protection for Puerto Rico under Title III of
PROMESA. Press Release, Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Oversight
Board Certifies Title III Filings (May 3, 2017), https://juntasuperivision.pr.gov/wp-content/
uploads/wpfd/49/590a09096cdl3.pdf.
1n Nathan Bomey, Why You Can't Ignore Puerto Rico's Bankruptcy, USA TODAY (May 4, 2017,
4:36 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/05/04/puerto-rico-bankruptcy/101284402;
Jaime Farrant, 4 Reasons Why Puerto Rico s 'Bankruptcy' Process Matters to U.S. Residents, NBC
NEWS (June 5, 2017, 7:39 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/4-reasons-why-puerto-rico-s-
bankruptcy-process-matters-u-n76699 1.
1 Sylvan Lane & Rafael Bernal, Hispanic Lawmakers Face Painful Decision on Puerto Rico, HILL
(May 30, 2016, 12:11 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/281542-hispanic-lawmakers-face-
painful-decision-on-puerto-rico (quoting U.S. Senator Bob Menendez).
12 A Colonial Takeover: Proposed Puerto Rican Debt Bill to Give "Dictatorial Powers" to
Unelected Board, DEMOCRACY NOW! (May 27, 2016), https://www.democracynow.org/2016/
5/27/a colonialtakeover proposedpuerto_rican.
" See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016) (explaining that
Puerto Rico is excluded from the definition of "State" for purposes of defining who may be a debtor
under Chapter 9, but that it remains a "State" for purposes of the chapter's preemption provision,
which bars it from devising its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure its debt).
1 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Davis v. Guam, No. 1:11 -cv-00035 (D. Guam
Oct. 30, 2015).
" Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015); see Complaint at 33, Fitisemanu v. U.S.,
No. 1:1 8-cv-00036-EJF (D. Utah Mar. 27, 2018) (contending that American Samoans are entitled to
birthright citizenship under the Citizenship Clause).
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Commonwealth,"l6 it lacks "inherent sovereignty" and is thus barred from
prosecuting an individual already charged federally for the same criminal act."
U.S. citizens from three territories argued in federal court that Congress and the
states unlawfully withhold the right to vote in U.S. presidential elections from
U.S. citizens who move to Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, but
not to those who move to the Northern Mariana Islands or American Samoa.'I
Aside from court observers, some academics and lawyers, and the
communities themselves, these cases largely go unnoticed. So, too, have the
Insular Cases, a series of cases decided from 1901 to 192219 that explicitly or
implicitly dictate the results in the above court challenges. Indeed, on the first
day of teaching my Pacific Island Legal Systems class, I asked students if they
had heard of the Insular Cases and only two raised their hands." These students
had all taken constitutional law, some had extensively studied anti-subordination
and racial justice, and others were well-versed in Native Hawaiian self-
governance issues, but the Insular Cases were absent from their studies.
Because the Insular Cases are largely not taught in law school and do not appear
in most mainstream casebooks, there is a yawning gap in the discourse about the
self-determination of and social justice for peoples of the U.S. territories.
For over a century, the Insular Cases have tightly circumscribed rights in
the territories. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Congress may provide
fewer benefits to residents of the territories as long as there is a rational basis to
do so,2 1 and appellate courts have held that the inability of territorial residents to
vote in U.S. presidential elections does not offend the Constitution.2 2 As seen in
cases impacting Puerto Ricans23 and American Samoans,24 as well as in cases
" Puerto Rico v. Sdnchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 (2016).
7 Id. at 1871-72.
'8 Brief of Appellants at 13-15, 25-26, Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 284 (7th Cir. June 30,
2017) (No. 16-4240); Segovia v. United States, EQUALLY AMERICAN, http://www.equalrightsnow.
org/Segovia (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
" See sources cited infra note 62.
20 1 co-taught Pacific Island Legal Systems in Spring 2016 with Chamorro human rights scholar and
activist Julian Aguon.
21 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980).
22 See, e.g., Igarthia-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); Attorney
Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984).
23 Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prevents Puerto Rico from successively prosecuting a person for a crime already prosecuted under
analogous federal law because Puerto Rico's power to prosecute comes from the same source as the
federal government's); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016) (explaining
that Puerto Rico is excluded from the definition of "State" for purposes of defining who may be a
debtor under Chapter 9, but that it remains a "State" for purposes of the chapter's preemption
provision, which bars it from devising its own municipal bankruptcy scheme to restructure its debt).
24 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that the Citizenship Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not extend birthright citizenship to individuals born in American
Samoa).
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affecting Indigenous Chamorus of Guam2 5 and the voting rights of U.S. citizens
residing in the territories,26 the Insular Cases continue to have immense-yet
largely unacknowledged-impact on territorial peoples' self-determination.
This Article contends that the Insular Cases, and possibly their
contemporary incarnations, should be taught in law school because they are
valuable for revealing the perspective of those most affected by them. Legal
scholar Mari Matsuda's seminal article, Looking to the Bottom, urged us to
adopt the perspective of those most oppressed as an essential starting point for
transforming legal discourse on justice.27 In doing so, she and others laid the
foundation for the emergence of Critical Race Theory and for grappling with the
ways that racial subordination shapes many dimensions of life and law in the
United States.28 Matsuda's theory also informs the ways in which law professors
can incorporate the Insular Cases into their classes. For example, one could
teach the Insular Cases in a constitutional law course to more fully explore the
development of our "American Nation"2 9; or in Race and the Law, to illustrate
one aspect of the diverse Latinx30 or Pacific Islander experience31 ; or in
specialized seminars to teach the development of jurisprudence governing the
U.S. territories. Matsuda's call to look to the bottom, guided by principles of
self-determination, serves as a conceptual framework for doing so.
Indeed, looking to those at the bottom in the context of colonized peoples
makes most powerful sense when that idea is linked to the significant
25 Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that a non-native Guam inhabitant had
standing to pursue a claim that a plebiscite vote registration restriction to "Native Inhabitants of
Guam" is a proxy for race in violation of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and that
the claim was ripe). This Article uses both "Chamoru" and "Chamorro" to describe the Indigenous
people of Guam.
26 Complaint, Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs for Chi., 201 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
(No. 15 C 10196) (arguing that a law allowing absentee voting for the President of the United States
by individuals residing in the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa, or a foreign country, but
not by individuals residing in Guam, Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands violates the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments).
27 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 324-26 (1987).
28 Eric K. Yamamoto & Susan K. Serrano, Reparations Theory and Practice Then and Now: Mau
Mau Redress Litigation and the British High Court, 18 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 71, 71-72
(2013).
29 See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 444 (6th ed. 2015) (presenting Insular Cases material in a section called "Creating an
'American' Nation").
30 "Latinx" is a term that seeks to move beyond the masculinized "Latino" and the traditional gender
binary "Latin@" to acknowledge the spectrum of gender and sexual identities. See Maria R.
Scharr6n-del Rio & Alan A. Aja, The Case FOR 'Latinx': Why Intersectionality Is Not a Choice,
LATINO REBELS (Dec. 5, 2015, 11:58 AM), http://www.latinorebels.com/2015/12/05/the-case-for-
latinx-why-intersectionality-is-not-a-choice.
31 See JUAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA
347-67 (3d ed. 2015); RICHARD DELGADO ET AL., LATINOS AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
52-64 (2008).
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international human rights norm of self-determination.32 In other words, we can
grasp a key facet of the meaning of self-determination for colonized peoples by
examining their responses to the Insular Cases, which have harshly shaped their
political and social existence. Paying close attention to the proactive justice
claims of those harmed by injustice" means examining their present-day usages
of or resistance to the "teachings" of the Insular Cases.
Territorial peoples are engaging the Insular Cases in disparate ways. On the
one hand, the cases have sharply constrained territorial peoples' rights, as
revealed by the U.S. Supreme Court's sweeping denial of Puerto Rico's inherent
sovereignty.34 On the other, however, the cases highlight the ways in which
territorial peoples are asserting claims to self-determination by employing the
very framework that was put in place to limit their participation in the polity.
For example, Guam is strategically embracing the Insular Cases framework to
argue that, unlike in the states, Congress can llow Guam to limit registration for
a political status plebiscite to the "Native Inhabitants of Guam," even if based on
ancestry." Thus, learning about the Insular Cases-their past impacts and
present deployment-will open law students' eyes to the significant nexus
between the cases' doctrine and the self-determination of those colonized.
Indeed, the principle of self-determination, a central tenet of reparative justice, is
vital to colonized peoples' efforts worldwide to repair the damage of historical
injustice.
Self-determination entails repairing the harms suffered by those who have
experienced systemic oppression according to their self-shaped notions of
reparation.37 This type of repair, or "reparative justice," focuses on mending
breaches in the polity by healing persisting wounds of harmed individuals and
communities." Its goal is to ascertain and respond to groups' self-determined
ideas of injury and remedy in order to "build[] new relationships as focal points
for fostering an interest-convergence among the victims of injustice . . . and
society itself" 39 As such, "[b]ecause the wounds are the material and
psychological harms of injustice, the prescriptions for healing those wounds
32 See infra notes 221-26 and accompanying text.
3 See Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims
in Reparations Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 257, 267-68 (2009); Eric K. Yamamoto et al.,
American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. I, 4-11 (2007).
34 Puerto Rico v. Sinchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr.,
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
3 See infra Section V.A.3.
36 See infra Section V.A.3.
37 See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics ofRemediation: Redressing the Legacy of
Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 203,
245 (2015).
3 Yamamoto et al., supra note 33, at 16.
39 Id. at 4.
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must be informed by justice,"'o shaped by both those harmed and the larger
society. The Insular Cases are, therefore, a way to deepen students'
understanding of self-determination as more than just a concept that derives
from United Nations instruments. Instead, it is a concept that speaks to repairing
harms according to the colonized group's sense of what is needed.
Some legal scholars, including constitutional law scholar Sanford Levinson,
have compellingly claimed that the Insular Cases should be part of the
constitutional law canon because knowledge of the cases would help to create
individuals who are well-informed about periods in constitutional development,
as well as provide academics with fresh and compelling constitutional questions
with which to grapple.41 In 2000, Levinson published his groundbreaking piece,
Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga
ofAmerican Expansionism, "to encourage the welcoming of Downes and linked
materials into the various canons of American constitutional inquiry.'12 But,
whether or not the cases become part of an elusive "canon," the Insular Cases
should be taught now because, over a century after the cases were decided,
territorial peoples' attempts to gain a measure of self-determination under U.S.
rule remain virtually invisible.
Part II examines the leading Insular Cases and the doctrine of territorial
incorporation, and then briefly highlights the ongoing impacts of the Insular
Cases on U.S. territorial peoples. Part III traces Levinson's canonical arguments,
as well as other scholars' interpretations of the import of the Insular Cases. This
Part also explores why the canon approach is meaningful but elusive, and tends
not to acknowledge those at the bottom. Part IV sketches Matsuda's "looking to
the bottom" conceptual framework, and explores her theory as it relates to the
larger principles of self-determination and reparative justice. Part V contends
that teaching the Insular Cases is valuable because they illuminate the
perspective of those most affected and reveal jurisprudential insights about the
principle of self-determination. This Part analyzes five modem-day cases to
illustrate the Insular Cases' lasting impacts on territorial peoples' self-
determination efforts, and to underscore the importance of teaching the Insular
Cases from the bottom. Finally, this Part briefly proposes some ways in which
law professors might incorporate the Insular Cases into their classes from the
perspective of those most impacted. Part VI concludes.
40
1 Id. at 39.
41 Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should Be Expanded to Include the Insular Cases and the Saga
of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 250 (2000); see infra notes 178-98 and
accompanying text.
42 Levinson, supra note 41, at 266.
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II. THE INSULAR CASES IN Socio-HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Today's stark limits on territorial peoples' self-determination are rooted in
the strategic U.S. embrace of "empire" following the Spanish-American War.43
The Territorial Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which empowers Congress "to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory
or other Property belonging to the United States,"44 gave the United States
authority to exercise power over its late-nineteenth century colonial conquests.45
The Clause today governs five unincorporated territories of the United States-
Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and the Northern
Mariana Islands-with a collective population of around four million people.46
This makes the United States "the largest overseas territorial power in the
world.'"'
Prior to the United States' 1898 territorial "acquisitions," the settled policy
governing U.S. territorial expansion led to the eventual admission of new
territories as states.48 The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which covered the
territory northwest of the original thirteen states, was viewed as "the governing
statute for the newly acquired territories by the courts or was followed as the
model in other governing legislation."' The Spanish-American War and the
resulting takeover of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Cuba triggered a
change in the settled model."o Rather than directing the territories toward
eventual statehood, the Treaty of Paris, which concluded the war, left the
determination of the "civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants" to
Congress." This meant that the peoples of the territories were not to "enter into
and form a part of the American family," 52 and were promised no civil or
43 See Romdn & Simmons, supra note 3, at 449.
44 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
45 See Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 246-47.
46 Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a "Constitution [That] Follows the Flag ... But Doesn't
Quite Catch Up with It": From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. Bush, 80 Miss. L.J. 181, 197
(2010) (citing ARNOLD H. LEIBOWITZ, DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED
STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS 3 (1980)).
47 LEIBOWITZ, supra note 46, at 3.
4 Id. at 6.
49 id.
5o Malavet, supra note 46, at 204.
5' Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, art. 9, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1759. "According to the Treaty, while
Spanish subjects residing in Puerto Rico retained their property rights and could choose to retain
Spanish citizenship, the 'civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants . . . [were to] be
determined by the Congress."' Susan K. Serrano, Collective Memory and the Persistence of
Injustice: From Hawai'i's Plantations to Congress-Puerto Ricans' Claims to Membership in the
Polity, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & Soc. JUST. 353, 372-73 (2011) (citing Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, art.
9, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1759).
52 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 339 (1901) (White, J., concurring); see Jos6 A. Cabranes,
Citizenship and the American Empire, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 391, 411 (1978) (observing that his was
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political rights under U.S. rule.
The United States' conquest of "distant lands" inhabited by "alien" and
"semi-civilized" peoples unleashed intense popular debates over the proper way
to rule them.53 The territories were viewed as "far off, not contiguous to the
continent, densely populated, unamenable to colonization by settlement on the
part of Anglo-Americans, and, above all, inhabited by alien peoples untrained in
the arts of representative government."54 One judge, for example, warned
against bestowing constitutional guarantees upon the "ignorant" and "half-
civilized" peoples of Puerto Rico and the Philippines:
Our Constitution was made by a civilized and educated
people. It provides guaranties of personal security which seem
ill adapted to the conditions of society that prevail in many
parts of our new possessions. To give the half-civilized Moros
of the Philippines, or the ignorant and lawless brigands that
infest Puerto Rico, or even the ordinary Filipino of Manila, the
benefit of such immunities . . . would, of course, be a serious
obstacle to the maintenance there of an efficient government.5
Decision-makers proclaimed that the United States should not "incorporate
the alien races, and civilized, semi-civilized, barbarous, and savage peoples of
these islands into our body politic as States of our Union."5 6 A report by the
Committee on the Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico warned against the inclusion
of "people of wholly different character . . . and incapable of exercising the
rights and privileges guaranteed by the Constitution."5 If a territory is inhabited
by such people, it argued, Congress should "withhold from [them] the operation
of the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and, continu[e] to hold the
territory as a mere possession of the United States."" The Foraker Act of
1900,59 which established a civil government for Puerto Rico, was therefore
the first time in which a U.S. treaty acquiring territory did not promise citizenship or eventual
statehood).
s Roman & Simmons, supra note 3, at 457.
1 Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 237-38.
" Simeon E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by
the United States of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REv. 393, 415 (1899); see Jos6 A. Cabranes,
Puerto Rico: Colonialism as Constitutional Doctrine, 100 HARV. L. REV. 450, 455 (1986) (book
review) (observing that arguments by anti-imperialists, like Baldwin, were "political expression[s] of
contempt for the peoples of the new territories").
16 Cabranes, supra note 52, at 432 (quoting 33 CONG. REC. 3622 (1900)).
7 RomAn & Simmons, supra note 3, at 455.
* Id. This debate over the legitimacy of the "American empire" was waged in the context of the
1900 election, in whish William McKinley, an imperialist, won in a landslide over William Jennings
Bryan, an anti-imperialist. See Pedro A. Malavet, "The Constitution Follows the Flag . . . But
Doesn't Quite Catch Up with It": The Story ofDownes v. Bidwell, in RACE LAW STORIES Ill, 124
(Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).
s Foraker Act, Pub. L. No. 56-191, 31 Stat. 77 (1900).
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"premised on the view that the United States could constitutionally acquire
territories, free of constitutional restrictions, and govern them indefinitely as
dependencies without steering them towards statehood."60
Thus, the settled view of eventual statehood for territories was upended, and
the United States expanded its empire and global reach "without the necessity of
fully accepting the people of color that inhabited the newly acquired
territories."6 As discussed below, the Insular Cases,62 a series of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions defining the status of the new U.S. territories, provided
constitutional legitimacy for this American colonialism."
A. Downes v. Bidwell and the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation
The Insular Cases further entrenched the notion that Congress had nearly
unfettered authority over U.S. insular possessions.64 In wrestling with persisting
questions about the status of the territories and the rights of their inhabitants, the
justices' approaches were distinctly shaped by the academic and popular debates
of the time. Did the Constitution apply in full force to the territories, thereby
conferring full-fledged citizenship on their inhabitants?" Did Congress, like the
European colonizers before them, have absolute power over the territories
60 Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 239.
61 RomAn & Simmons, supra note 3, at 453.
62 Efr6n Rivera Ramos groups the Insular Cases into two main categories: the 1901 cases and those
that followed through 1922. The nine 1901 cases include: De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); Crossman v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York, 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Dooley v.
United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); and Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176
(1901). The later cases include: Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); GonzAlez v. Williams,
192 U.S. I (1904); Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904); Mendezona v. United States, 195 U.S. 158 (1904); Rassmussen v. United States, 197
U.S. 516 (1905); Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S.
333 (1907); Kent v. Porto Rico, 207 U.S. 113 (1907); Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468 (1909);
Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Ochoa v. HernAndez, 230 U.S. 139 (1913); Ocampo
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). EFRtN RIVERA
RAMOS, THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY: THE JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL LEGACY OF
AMERICAN COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO 74-76 (2001).
63 Torruella, supra note 3, at 6 ("The de facto colonial status had to be validated by a legal regime
that would de jure allow the United States to govern the new lands and their people with a free hand,
untethered by the constitutional constraints that normally restrained the governmental structures of
the continental United States.").
" RomAn & Simmons, supra note 3, at 457-59.
's Two U.S. Supreme Court decisions supported this proposition. See Loughborough v. Blake, 18
U.S. 317, 319 (1820) (noting that the Constitution applies to all of the "American empire," and
therefore states and territories are subject equally to the Constitution); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. 393, 446 (1856) (proclaiming that Congress lacked power under the Territorial Clause to
prohibit slavery in Missouri Territory because Congress could not maintain and govern territories in
a permanent colonial state).
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without constitutional constraints?"6 Or, did Congress have sweeping power
over the territories, with some constitutional limitations?" According to this
final theory, the constitutional provisions that apply to a territory (and therefore
serve to limit Congress's and the executive's power) depend on that territory's
relationship to the United States. This final approach came to be the dominant
framework in the Insular Cases.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard the first nine Insular Cases in its 1900
Term, and issued decisions on May 27, 1901.68 The Insular Cases were at the
center of constitutional debate in their day-they were heard over a ten-day
period, and the resulting decisions filled up "hundreds of pages over two
volumes of the U.S. Reports."69 Called "the most hotly contested and long
continued duel in the life of the Supreme Court,"7o the cases "reportedly
stimulated stronger feelings among the justices of the Supreme Court than any
case since Scott v. Sandford (the Dred Scott case)."7 1
Most of the first Insular Cases involved disputes over the imposition of
tariffs on agricultural goods shipped from Puerto Rico to the continental United
States.72 In De Lima v. Bidwell, for example, De Lima sought to recover duties
levied under protest for importation of sugar from Puerto Rico after that territory
was "ceded" to the United States, but before the Foraker Act was passed in
1900.7' The Court held that the cession of Puerto Rico to the United States
transformed Puerto Rico from "foreign" to "domestic"; thus, duties were
illegal. 74 In Dooley v. United States, the Court ruled that duties levied on
products sent from the continental United States to Puerto Rico before
ratification of the Treaty of Paris were legal, but those levied on goods shipped
after the Treaty's ratification were illegal because Puerto Rico was no longer
foreign.75 These and other cases set the stage for the main case of Downes v.
Bidwell.
In Downes v. Bidwell, the most important of the Insular Cases, the U.S.
66 See Torruella, supra note 3, at 10-11.
6 7See id. at 11.
6 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 244 (1901).
61 Malavet, supra note 58, at 126.
7o Cabranes, supra note 52, at 436 (quoting John W. Davis, Edward Douglass White, 7 A.B.A. J.
377, 378 (1921)).
71 Id.
72 See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
73 De Lima, 182 U.S. at 2.
74 Id. at 200. In Goetze v. United States, the Court summarily reversed an administrative decision to
impose a duty on products shipped from Puerto Rico and Hawai'i to the continental United States
because those territories were domestic, not foreign. Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221, 221-22
(1901).
7 Dooley, 182 U.S. at 233-34.
405
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
Supreme Court held that the Foraker Act's express imposition of duties on
goods shipped between Puerto Rico and the continental United States did not
violate the Uniformity Clause and was thus constitutional. 16 Directly
contradicting the earlier cases, the Court sanctioned the imposition of duties on
goods shipped from Puerto Rico." Five justices filed separate opinions, and no
opinion garnered a majority. According to Justice Brown, who delivered the
judgment of the Court, the issue was not only whether the Foraker Act violated
the Uniformity Clause of the Constitution, but also whether the Uniformity
Clause, of its own force, "extend[ed] . . . to ... newly acquired territories."" For
him, the Clause did not apply to Puerto Rico because "the island of Porto Rico is
a territory appurtenant and belonging to the United States, but not a part of the
United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution."7 9
Justice Brown, like other decision-makers of his day, warned of the
consequences for U.S. sovereignty if the United States incorporated racially
distinct peoples. For him, peoples of different "race[s], habits, laws and
customs" from "outlying and distant possessions" threatened the very heart of
white Anglo-Saxon dominance. 8 He warned of the "extremely serious"
consequences if the offspring of the colonies' inhabitants, "whether savages or
civilized," would become "entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of
citizens.""' He thus concluded that nothing forbade Congress from exercising
wide-ranging political power over those possessions "inhabited by alien races,
differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of
thought."82
Justice White's concurring opinion, which later became the controlling
"doctrine of territorial incorporation," fashioned a new category of territory-
the "unincorporated" territory. According to Justice White, whether particular
provisions of the Constitution apply in a territory depends on "the situation of
76 See Downes, 182 U.S. at 287.
77 id.
7 Id. at 249.
7 Id. at 287. The U.S. government misspelled Puerto Rico as "Porto Rico" for nearly thirty-five
years-from 1898 to 1932. See Cabranes, supra note 52, at 392. The misspelling was changed by
joint resolution on May 17, 1932. S.J. Res. 36, 72d Cong. (1932) (enacted).
8o Downes, 182 U.S. at 282 (noting that this "may require action on the part of Congress that would
be quite unnecessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same
race, or by scattered bodies of native Indians").
' Id. at 279.
82 Id. at 287; see Juan F. Perea, Fulfilling Manifest Destiny: Conquest, Race, and the Insular Cases,
in FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION
140, 157 (Christina Duffy Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001) (observing that Justice Brown
invoked the Court's "ideology of conquest" by relying heavily on Johnson v. M'Intosh, which
employed the "doctrine of discovery" to justify the forcible conquest of Native Americans); Downes,
182 U.S. at 281 (proclaiming that "[w]hen the conquest is complete, . . . the conquered inhabitants
can be blended with the conquerors, or safely governed as a distinct people" (alteration in original)
(quoting Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823))).
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the territory and its relations to the United States."83 Therefore, the question
whether the Foraker Act's tax on Puerto Rican goods was proper depended on a
determination whether Puerto Rico was "incorporated into the United States."84
Because Congress did not intend to incorporate Puerto Rico through the Treaty
of Paris, the Foraker Act, or by other means, Justice White determined that it
was an unincorporated territory.s
According to Justice White's reading of international law and the U.S.
Constitution, sovereign nations held the inherent right to acquire territory and,
concomitantly, by "the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession or on such as its
new master shall impose,"86 to decide the nature of the relationship between that
nation and its territory. He maintained that the United States specifically
intended to incorporate all of the previously acquired territories, and that such
intention was-and must be-made by Congress either expressly or implicitly."
One prior indicator of congressional intent to incorporate was whether the
territory's people were given U.S. citizenship; but as the U.S. Supreme Court
later decided in Balzac v. Porto Rico, the granting of citizenship to a territory's
inhabitants does not evince Congress' intent to incorporate a territory. 8
Therefore, Puerto Rico was not immediately incorporated after its acquisition.
For Justice White, a decision to immediately incorporate had grave
consequences: it implicated "bring[ing] all the alien people residing in acquired
territory into the United States, and thus divid[ing] with them the rights which
peculiarly belong to the citizens of the United States."89
Thus, perplexingly, Puerto Rico was both foreign and domestic at the same
time. Justice White explained:
[W]hile in an international sense Porto Rico was not a foreign
country, since it was subject to the sovereignty of and was
owned by the United States, it was foreign to the United States
in a domestic sense, because the island had not been
incorporated into the United States, but was merely
appurtenant hereto as a possession.90
Pursuant to its plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Congress therefore
could determine which portions of the Constitution apply, limited only by
" Downes, 182 U.S. at 293 (White, J., concurring).
84 id.
* Id. at 341.
xsId at 302 (alteration in original) (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542
(1828)).
8 Id. at 319-23; e.g., id. at 335.
" See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922).
89 Downes, 182 U.S. at 324 (White, J., concurring) (invoking the ideology of discovery to illustrate
the United States' right to withhold citizenship from "those absolutely unfit to receive it").
9 Id. at 341-42.
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"restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be transgressed,
although not expressed in so many words in the Constitution."91
In dissent, Chief Justice Fuller rejected indefinite and unlimited
congressional control over the territories.9 2 Fuller maintained that regarding the
imposition of taxes, the Constitution requires "geographical uniformity 9 3 in
both states and territories. He repudiated the idea that Congress had the power to
keep acquired territory "like a disembodied shade, in an intermediate state of
ambiguous existence for an indefinite period."' For Fuller, the majority's theory
would empower the United States to conquer distant countries and govern them
"by different rules" in an "exercise of unrestricted power."" Similarly, in
dissent, Justice Harlan contended that the Constitution applied to all "who are
subject to the authority of the United States."'96 He also flatly rejected Congress'
ability to act outside of the Constitution to "engraft upon our republican
institutions a colonial system such as exists under monarchical governments."
As Judge Jos6 Cabranes later recognized, although the specific legal issue
involved the legality of customs duties, the U.S. Supreme Court in Downes
affirmed Congress' power to distinguish between unincorporated and
incorporated territories, which "gave judicial approval to the birth of 'the
American Empire."" Indeed, the first nine Insular Cases "ushered us into a
second age of expansion" that did not admit territories through statehood, but
held "colonies subject to almost absolute congressional authority."99 Judge
Torruella similarly asserted that "the Supreme Court placed its imprimatur on a
colonial relationship in which Congress could exercise virtually unchecked
power over the unincorporated territories ad infinitum." 00
9' Id. at 291.
92 Id. at 372-73 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 352.
94 Id. at 372.
" Downes, 182 U.S. at 373 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (maintaining that the majority's theory would
permit the imposition of "a system of domination" over the territories).
96 Id. at 378 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 380; see id. at 386 (rejecting the paradoxical outcome that Puerto Rico could be both foreign
and domestic at he same time). In 1904, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the so-called doctrine of
territorial incorporation in Dorr v. United States. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143, 149
(1904) (holding that the constitutional right to trial by jury did not extend to the Philippines unless
Congress provided such a right, and proclaiming that "[u]ntil Congress shall see fit to incorporate
territory ceded by treaty into the United States, . . . the territory is to be governed under the power
existing in Congress to make laws for such territories").
* Cabranes, supra note 52, at 436.
* Malavet, supra note 58, at 136.
1" Juan R. Torruella, LHacia Donde Vas Puerto Rico?, 107 YALE L.J. 1503, 1509 (1998) (book
review).
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B. Balzac v. Porto Rico and the Aftermath of the Insular Cases
Nearly twenty years after Downes, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
notion that the granting of U.S. citizenship operated to incorporate an
unincorporated territory.i'o Jesus Balzac, an editor of a Puerto Rican newspaper,
was charged with misdemeanor libel for comments published about Puerto
Rico's governor.'02 Balzac argued that he was entitled to a trial by jury under the
Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, even though Puerto Rico's code of
criminal procedure provided for jury trials only in felony cases.0 3 The U.S.
Supreme Court held that residents of unincorporated territories do not have a
Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.104
Significantly, the Court ruled that the Jones Act, which had conferred U.S.
citizenship on Puerto Rico's inhabitants in 1917, did not operate to
"incorporate[] Porto Rico into the United States."' The U.S. Supreme Court
proclaimed that residents of Puerto Rico could not demand a trial by jury
because "[i]t is locality that is determinative of the application of the
Constitution, in such matters as judicial procedure, and not the status of the
people who live in it." 0 6
Unlike Alaska, which was "sparsely settled" and amenable to settlement by
white American citizens, the Court again viewed the Philippines and Puerto
Rico as "distant ocean communities of a different origin and language from
those of our continental people."0 7 As such, the Court did not believe a jury
right should be imposed on these "ancient communities" with little knowledge
of popular government.' The peoples of the unincorporated territories are
therefore entitled only to "guaranties of certain fundamental personal rights
declared in the Constitution."o' These fundamental rights are not those deemed
"fundamentally important in a colloquial sense" or those that are "necessary to
[the] []American regime of ordered liberty.""0o Instead, fundamental rights in the
'0 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-14 (1922) ("[T]he real issue in the Insular Cases was not
whether the Constitution extended to the Philippines or Porto Rico when we went there, but which
ones of its provisions were applicable by way of limitation upon the exercise of executive and
legislative power in dealing with new conditions and requirements.").
102 Id. at 300.
103 id.




'o' Id. at 309.
107 Balzac, 258 U.S. at 309, 311.
"o Id. at 310 (declaring that Filipinos and Puerto Ricans would have difficulty adopting Anglo-
Saxon institutions of popular government).
'9 Id. at 312.
"o Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (citing Wabol
v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1460 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
n.14 (1968))). In other words, fundamental rights for territorial peoples do not include those
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territorial context are those "which are the basis of all free government, which
cannot be with impunity transcended."".1
Therefore, to determine whether a constitutional guarantee applies to a
territory, the Court asks whether extending such provision would be
"impracticable and anomalous."ll2 In other words, when determining whether a
constitutional guarantee has "extraterritorial effect," the Court considers the
"particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives
which Congress had before it.""' Courts have employed this framework to
decide whether to extend an array of constitutional protections to the
unincorporated territories with mixed results.' 14
Most recently, in Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed
the Insular Cases and employed the "impracticable and anomalous" test to hold
that "enemy combatants" confined at Guantinamo Bay Naval Station have a
constitutional right to habeas corpus review of their detention."' Finding that
applying the constitutional right to habeas in Guantinamo would not be
impracticable and anomalous, the Court held that the Suspension Clause of the
Constitution "has full effect at Guantanamo Bay."'16 Scholars have analyzed the
propriety of the Court's reliance on the Insular Cases and the "impracticable and
anomalous" test in Boumediene."' Legal scholar Gerald Neuman contends that
"artificial or remedial rights which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence." Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901).
". Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904); Downes, 182 U.S. at 283 (deciding that,
regardless of the status of the territories, their people are "entitled under the principles of the
Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and property ... even when aliens, not possessed of the
political rights of citizens of the United States"); see Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1460 (noting that a
fundamental right in the territorial context need not be "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of
ordered liberty" (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 n.14)).
112 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
" Id. (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring)). The "impracticable and anomalous"
methodology was initially articulated in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Reid, and further
developed in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting language from
Reid); see Jesse Merriam, A Clarification of the Constitution's Application Abroad: Making the
"Impracticable and Anomalous" Standard More Practicable and Less Anomalous, 21 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 171, 187 (2012).
114 See, e.g., King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975). (analyzing whether the
implementation of a jury system would be practicable); Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (ruling that it
would be anomalous to apply the Equal Protection Clause to strike down ancestral land ownership
restrictions in the Northern Marianas); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 277-78 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (applying the "impracticable and anomalous" test in the Fourth Amendment context).
'5 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
116 id.
''7 See, e.g., Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After
Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 973 (2009); Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution
After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over
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Boumediene presented "a sanitized account of the motivations for the Insular
Cases doctrine, underplaying the racial element in U.S. colonialism," and
ignored modem-day effects."' Indeed, according to Pedro Malavet, "[t]he Court
reasserted a rule of plenary power over territorial citizens while barely
acknowledging those citizens' existence . . . ."119
C. Ongoing Impacts of the Doctrine of Territorial Incorporation
Although unacknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Insular Cases
have long-lasting detrimental impacts on the peoples of the U.S. territories.
Scholars assert that the Insular Cases reflect a discourse of exclusion and frame
territorial peoples as perpetual "foreigners," "outsiders," and "others," thereby
facilitating their marginalization.120 For example, legal scholar Efrin Rivera
Ramos maintains that the Insular Cases reflect "a discourse that stresses the
separateness between the conquering people and the conquered."'2' For Rivera
Ramos, the "doctrine of incorporation" fosters the prevailing practice of
constructing "the 'other' as a 'separate,' but subordinated, identity" to justify
unequal treatment.122
Rivera Ramos similarly recognizes that by describing Puerto Ricans as an
inferior racial group incapable of self-governance, instead of as a people with a
history and aspirations, the Supreme Court "defined Puerto Ricans not as a
nation, but as inhabitants of an island that had become a possession of the
United States."23 As legal scholar Juan Perea contends, "[p]lacing the political
fate and identity of Puerto Ricans in the discretion of Congress guaranteed that
racism would play a major role in shaping that fate." 24 That racism and denial
of humanity legitimates today's continued control and exclusion.
In concrete terms, that exclusion impacts the everyday lives of the peoples
of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the
Northern Mariana Islands in far-reaching ways-from the political to the
economic, and the social to the cultural.125 Residents of the territories lack
Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 240-47 (2002); Andrew Kent, Boumediene, Munaf. and the
Supreme Court's Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. REV. 101 (2011).
11 Neuman, supra note 117, at 270.
"' Malavet, supra note 46, at 255.
120 See Serrano, supra note 51, at 426-28.




123 Id. at 305.
124 Perea, supra note 82, at 159.
125 See generally EDIBERTO ROMAN, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THE UNITED STATES' NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH
CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS (2006) (analyzing the historic and present-day impacts of U.S.
colonialism on the peoples of both the unincorporated territories and the island groups of the South
Pacific, including the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of
Palau).
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political power on the national stage-they cannot vote in U.S. presidential
elections 126 and have no voting representatives in Congress. 127 Territorial
residents are statutory U.S. citizens (except for American Samoans, who are
U.S. nationals), and, as some scholars have argued, this citizenship is second-
class because Congress can revoke it at any time.128
In the socio-economic sphere, territorial residents are also disadvantaged.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that if there is a rational basis for
doing so, federal programs can provide less aid to territorial residents.'29
Similarly, the Court held that it is constitutional for the Social Security
Administration to discontinue Supplemental Security Income benefit payments
to aged, blind, and disabled persons who move to the territories.130
The Insular Cases framework also threatens customary rights and cultural
practices in the territories. For example, an individual challenged Indigenous
ancestry-based restrictions on certain acquisitions of land in the Northern
Mariana Islands, which were designed to further the self-determination of
Indigenous Chamorros and Carolinians. "' Courts have permitted these
restrictions by holding that the relevant provisions of the U.S. Constitution (such
as the Equal Protection Clause) do not apply in that territory.13 2 American
Samoa's ancestry-based restriction on the alienation of land also has been
challenged, but the High Court of American Samoa held that the restriction
survived strict scrutiny.3 3
For many in the territories, the inability to decide their own political fate is
deeply subordinating. These harms "are not isolated abstract ideas but are found
in people's 'lived experiences,' grounded in their 'every day lives."'"34 Drawing
on the work of Joe R. Feagin and Melvin P. Sikes on racism against African
Americans, legal scholar Eric Yamamoto observes that these harms of injustice
1 26 gartha-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 148, 151 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that Puerto
Rican residents have no constitutional or international law right to vote in U.S. presidential
elections).
127 See Member FAQs, OFFICE OF THE CLERK, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://clerk.house.
gov/memberinfo/memberfaq.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2018) (stating with regard to Delegates and
the Resident Commissioner that "unlike Members, they may not vote while the House is conducting
business as the Committee of the Whole or vote on the final passage of legislation when the House is
meeting").
128 See, e.g., Ediberto Romhn, The Alien-Citizen Paradox and Other Consequences of U.S.
Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 13-14 (1998) (citing Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)).
129 Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651, 651-52 (1980).
130 Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 2, 4 (1978).
' 3 Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1451-53 (9th Cir. 1990).
132 Id. at 1462.
133 Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, I Am. Samoa 2d 10 (1980) (holding that due process and equal
protection guarantees do apply in American Samoa, that the preservation of American Samoa's
culture was a compelling state interest, and that the restriction was narrowly tailored).
3 Yamamoto et al., supra note 33, at 40.
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"have a cumulative impact on particular individuals, their families, and their
communities.""' They are, over time, "stored not only in individual memories
but also in family stories and group recollections," and "shape both 'one's way
of living . . . and one's life perspective."'"" Legal scholar Julian Aguon
poignantly describes how many Indigenous Chamorus of Guam feel "a sense of
resignation" and defeat, and "have given up on the hope that [self-
determination] will ever happen, so there's kind of like a 'learned
helplessness.""3  Individuals and communities thus experience the psychic harm
of having their histories and selves continually defined by others-of being
"spectators of [their] history without being able to do anything."'38
III. THE INSULAR CASES IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM: AN OVERVIEW
That subordination is linked, in part, to the Insular Cases, but most law
students are wholly unfamiliar with the cases or their continuing effects. This
Part describes the general absence of the Insular Cases from law school
casebooks and courses. It then explores other scholars' arguments for including
the Insular Cases in the law school curriculum, focusing particularly on Sanford
Levinson's call to include Downes v. Bidwell in the constitutional law canon.
Finally, it suggests that the Insular Cases should be taught from the perspective
of those "at the bottom" because of the cases' lasting impacts on those most
affected.
A. The General Absence of the Insular Casesfrom Law School Casebooks and
Courses
Despite the Insular Cases' persisting harms, most law school courses make
little to no mention of them.' A review of recent casebooks underscores the
general lack of meaningful coverage of the Insular Cases.4 0 For example, of the
1' Id. (quoting JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SlIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-
CLASS EXPERIENCE 16 (1994)).
16 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting FEAGIN & SIKES, supra note 135, at 16, 171).
137 Julian Aguon, Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights Legal Strategy for the Chamoru People
of Guam Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts, 31 U. HAW. L.
REV. 113, 142 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Patricia Taimanglo, An Exploratory Study of
Community Trauma and Culturally Responsive Counseling with Chamorro Clients 141 (May 1998)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst)).
"8 Navarro, supra note 1 (quoting Puerto Rican resident Erika P. Rodriguez).
1' See Gabriel A. Terrasa, The United States, Puerto Rico, and the Territorial Incorporation
Doctrine: Reaching A Century of Constitutional Authoritarianism, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 55, 57
n.13 (1997) (quoting Justice Rehnquist's remark that "[e]ven the most astute law student of today
would probably be completely unfamiliar with these cases; indeed, even when I went to law school
more than 30 years ago, they rated only a footnote in a constitutional law case book" and Judge Jose
A. Cabranes's assertion that "Justice Rehnquist's observation was equally true when I went to law
school more than 20 years ago-only then I (who searched diligently) had difficulty finding that
footnote").
140 See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS (12th
ed. 2015); JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (14th ed.
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constitutional law casebooks reviewed, only Processes of Constitutional
Decisionmaking: Cases and Materials contains extensive coverage of Downes v.
Bidwell.141 The book devotes ten pages to excerpts of the Downes opinions, and
situates Downes in larger discussions of expansionism, incorporation, political
status, race, and culture.142 The accompanying discussion questions also raise
issues of citizenship, voting, and the future of Puerto Rico's political status.143
Other constitutional law casebooks make only passing mention of the
Insular Cases. For example, Constitutional Law queries whether the U.S.
government was "bound by the Constitution when it exercise[d] jurisdiction
outside of the United States," and briefly places Downes in the context of U.S.
expansionism.'" Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law: Themes for the
Constitution's Third Century'45 and The Constitution of the United States146 also
provide short references to the Insular Cases.
Casebooks in other areas of law offer limited mention of the Insular Cases.
For example, US. National Security Law excerpts Dorr v. United States to
illustrate the extraterritorial application of the Constitution as an introduction to
the investigation of national security threats abroad.147 Conflict ofLaws devotes
one page to the various opinions of the Insular Cases and the territorial
incorporation doctrine to demonstrate how U.S. colonialism impacted the scope
of the Constitution.148 A few casebooks fleetingly discuss one or more of the
Insular Cases, or offer a simple citation with little explanation.'4 9 As Sanford
2013); WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (5th ed. 2014);
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND NOTES (11th ed. 2015);
ERNEST A. YOUNG, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE (2012); GREGORY
E. MAGGS & PETER J. SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2d ed. 2011).
14 BREST ET AL., supra note 29, at 445-55.
142 Id. at 444-57. The section is part of a chapter entitled "From Reconstruction to the New Deal:
1866-1934." Id. at 347.
143 Id. at 455-57.
144 KATHLEEN SULLIVAN &NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421 (19th ed. 2016). This brief
note falls within the "Separation of Powers" chapter, in a section called "Congressional War and
Treaty Powers, and the Implied Power over Foreign Affairs." Id. at 303, 413.
145 See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR
THE CONSTITUTION'S THIRD CENTURY 143 (5th ed. 2013).
146 See MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1354 (3d ed.
2017).
147 THOMAS M. FRANCK ET AL., U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
SIMULATIONS 1121-25 (4th ed. 2012).
14' KERMIT ROOSEVELT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 241-42 (2d ed. 2015); see CLYDE SPILLENGER,
PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 433-34 (2d ed. 2015) (using the Insular Cases doctrine to
illustrate the complexity of the extraterritorial application of the Constitution).
"4 See, e.g., THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 113-
14 (2016); STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 133 (6th ed. 2015); Louis HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 305 (2d ed. 2009); HERMA
HILL KAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 1000 (10th ed. 2018);
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Levinson indicates, although the Insular Cases are "central documents in the
history of American racism," the cases do not appear at all in Derrick Bell's
seminal treatise on race and law, Race, Racism, and American Law,15 0 nor in F.
Michael Higginbotham's Race Law: Cases, Commentary, and Questions.'5
In contrast, two Critical Race Theory casebooks do include significant
treatment of the Insular Cases. Race and Races: Cases and Resources for a
Diverse America offers extensive coverage of key Insular Cases and their
impact on the status of Puerto Rico.'52 Similarly, Latinos and the Law: Cases
and Materials includes extensive discussion of the cases in the text, as well as in
the notes and questions."I
The absence of extensive coverage of the Insular Cases from most
casebooks mirrors their general absence from legal scholarship, except in a few
specialized settings. As legal scholar Christina Duffy Burnett contends, the
debate on the status of the Constitution in the territories is for the most part "a
marginal debate about marginal places" that rages primarily in the affected
territories.54 Legal scholar Pedro Malavet similarly recognizes that "the Insular
Cases are but legal footnotes in U.S. legal scholarship, outside of Critical Race
Theory generally and Lat-Crit Theory in particular."'s Although it now appears
that more law faculty are including at least a mention of the Insular Cases in
ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 119 (3d ed.
2015).
50 Levinson, supra note 41, at 245; see DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW (6th
ed. 2008). The Insular Cases are still omitted from the most recent edition of this casebook.
' See F. MICHAEL HIGGINBOTHAM, RACE LAW: CASES, COMMENTARY, AND QUESTIONS (3d ed.
2010); see also RALPH RICHARD BANKS ET AL., RACIAL JUSTICE AND LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
933-38 (2016) (omitting the Insular Cases, but discussing the interplay of voting rights, political
status, race, American imperialism, and democratic principles in the notes and questions); STEPHEN
B. PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: CASES AND
MATERIALS (8th ed. 2013) (omitting the Insular Cases entirely). A review of a number of Legal
History syllabi also reveals the omission of the Insular Cases. See, e.g., Karen Tani, The U.S. Legal
History Survey Revisited: I, LEGAL HISTORY BLOG (May 1, 2013, 12:30 AM), http://legal
historyblog.blogspot.com/2013/05/the-us-legal-history-survey-revisited-i.html#more; Legal History
on the Web, TRIANGLE LEGAL HISTORY SEMINAR, https://law.duke.edu/legalhistory/portal/
syllabi.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2018); Syllabus, Anders Walker, American Legal History (Spring
2012), https://ssm.com/abstract-2137814.
152 PEREA ET AL., supra note 31, at 349-67 (including excerpts from Downes v. Bidwell, the Treaty
of Paris, and Balzac v. Porto Rico, as well as sections on the Puerto Rico commonwealth, Puerto
Rican citizenship, and Puerto Ricans' current political status); see id. at 355, 360 (providing notes
and questions about the ideology of expansion and voting rights).
'. DELGADO ET AL., supra note 31, at 52-64 (discussing the Foraker Act and excerpts of Downes v.
Bidwell and Balzac v. Porto Rico).
154 Duffy Burnett, supra note 117, at 1040-41.
' Malavet, supra note 46, at 250-51. But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Puerto Rico and the
Constitution. Conundrums and Prospects, II CONST. COMMENT. 15 (1994) (exploring the modern-
day implications of the Insular Cases on Puerto Rico's political status); GERALD L. NEUMAN,
STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996)
(analyzing the Insular Cases as part of a larger exploration of the constitutional foundations of
immigration law).
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casebooks and courses,'5 6 the cases are indeed far from being installed into the
constitutional law canon.
The faculty at my law school do not, as of this writing, incorporate the
Insular Cases into their courses.' Most faculty members remarked that the
reason for not teaching Downes, for example, was because it did not appear in
the relevant casebooks. My class, Pacific Island Legal Systems, appears to be
the only course at our law school that currently examines the Insular Cases.5 8
The Insular Cases' present-day impacts on the status of Guam, American
Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands are prominent in our syllabus.s9
B. Existing Arguments for Including the Insular Cases in the Law School
Curriculum
Legal scholars whose work centers on the status of the territories powerfully
describe the import of the Insular Cases. For many, the Insular Cases are vital
to understanding U.S. expansionism because the cases forced the United States
to grapple with whether it "could emulate the European nations and conquer and
possess colonial territories."'" Following the Spanish-American War, U.S.
decision-makers sought to govern the new territories and their peoples "with a
free hand, untethered by the constitutional constraints that normally restrained
the governmental structures of the continental United States."' At that time, the
debate over the U.S. takeover and control of new territories was of paramount
importance because the United States was constructing its identity as a
powerful-yet facially respectable-nation within the international
community.162
Thus, many emphasize the Insular Cases' importance in shaping the United
States as a nation. Legal scholar Ediberto Romin asserts, for example, that he
156 See supra notes 141-49, 152-53 and accompanying text.
157 See, e.g., Interview with Eric Yamamoto, Professor of Law, William S. Richardson Sch. of Law,
in Honolulu, Hawai'i (Aug. 25, 2016); E-mail from Charles E. Colman, Assistant Professor of Law,
William S. Richardson Sch. of Law, to Susan Serrano (June 8, 2017, 5:57 PM HST) (on file with
author) (indicating that if he teaches Conflicts of Law again he will likely include "issues of the sort
raised by the Insular Cases").
58 Our colleague, the late Jon Van Dyke, taught and wrote extensively about U.S. territories in the
Pacific. See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Betveen the United States and Its
Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445 (1992).
15 See infra note 482 and accompanying text.
16o Levinson, supra note 41, at 246; see Jos6 A. Cabranes, Some Common Ground, in FOREIGN INA
DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICo, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 82, at
39, 43 ("It is fair to say that [the territorial incorporation doctrine] was devised in order to make
colonialism possible."); Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 284-91 (outlining the "ideology of
expansion" discourse in the Insular Cases); Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1197, 1221 (1996) (describing "[t]he colonialism authorized in the Insular Cases").
16' Torruella, supra note 3, at 6; see STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, JR., THE LAW OF UNITED STATES
TERRITORIES AND AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS 105-27 (1995); LEIBOWITZ, supra note 46, at 19-26.
162 RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 62, at 104.
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Insular Cases solidified the United States' "position as 'the colonizer who
refuses""63 : the colonizer who directly conquers other lands "while at the same
time denouncing imperialism elsewhere and remaining comfortable with its
conscience."l6 4 As many contend, to enable the United States to compete with
Europe's colonial expansion, the Insular Cases treated the unincorporated
territories as essentially "extraconstitutional" areas never destined for
statehood.' This gave Congress nearly unrestricted power to govern the
territories and their peoples indefinitely.
In contrast, Christina Duffy Burnett views the Insular Cases as creating the
constitutional doctrine of "deannexation."66 She contends that "the epochal
significance of the cases lies in their careful creation of a new kind of U.S.
territory: a domestic territory that could be governed temporarily, and then later,
if necessary, be relinquished."'6' On the heels of the Civil War, when the United
States was preoccupied with the indivisibility of the nation, the Insular Cases
allowed for experimentation with U.S. imperial expansion without permanent
consequences. Rather than being forever bound to its unincorporated territories,
the United States could surrender them.'6 For Duffy Burnett, this is the cases'
most significant contribution to constitutional law regarding U.S. territorial
expansion.69
As discussed above, the inherent racism legitimized in Downes v. Bidwell is
significant. For example, Efrin Rivera Ramos underscores "[t]he obvious
racism" and "the ideologies of Manifest Destiny and Social Darwinism"
underlying the Court's view that territorial peoples "were not fit to become full-
fledged members of the American polity."' Pedro Malavet similarly claims
that Downes concerned the U.S. government's power to exclude peoples who
were "racialized as something 'other' than 'Americans.""' Juan Perea contends
163 Ediberto Romlin, Empire Forgotten: The United States's Colonization ofPuerto Rico, 42 VILL. L.
REv. 1119, 1147 (1997) (quoting ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED 19
(1965)).
164 Id. at 1148; see Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 228 (explaining how the Insular Cases and "the
doctrine they established became an important constituent element of the colonial project: a
significant dimension of Puerto Rican reality as conditioned by the colonial experience"); Christina
Duffy Burnett, "They Say I Am Not an American . . .": The Noncitizen National and the Law of
American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 659, 667 (2008) (contending that one of the Insular Cases,
Gonzdlez v. Williams, sheds light on the U.S. empire and that "turn-of-the-twentieth-century
imperialism helped shape a modem American nation").
165 See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
166 Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U.
CHI. L. REv. 797, 802 (2005).
1
67 Id. at 797.
161 See id. at 803.
169 See id. at 801.
170 Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 290.
... Malavet, supra note 46, at 246. Sanford Levinson contends that the Insular Cases should be
placed in the context of the history of American racism or "'ascriptivism,' the view that to be a 'true
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that the Downes Court invoked its "ideology of conquest" to sanction control
over those viewed as "savages."72 As mentioned, Justice Brown warned in
Downes of the grave consequences if the offspring of the colonies' inhabitants
were entitled to the rights of American citizens.'17
Judge Torruella maintains that the Insular Cases established "a regime of de
facto political apartheid."l74 For him, "the Insular Cases are on par with the
Court's infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson in licencing the downgrading
of the rights of discrete minorities within the political hegemony of the United
States."'17 For these and other reasons, scholars contend that the cases should be
included in the law school curriculum, and that their omission from
contemporary legal education perpetuates a "sanitized history of the status
quo" 76 and "a skewed understanding of legal history and constitutional law."1 77
Most notably, Levinson posited that the constitutional law canon should be
expanded to include the Insular Cases and the "saga of American
expansionism" 178 for pedagogical, cultural literacy, and academic theory
reasons.'7 9 If the purpose of the canon is pedagogical, students should learn
about cases that are likely to prepare them to be practicing lawyers.'10 This
means learning about cases that may structure their own law practice, or about
doctrines that are current, lively, and likely to be useful to adjudicators.'"' This
also means exposing students to cases that serve as models for the arts of
lawyering and legal reasoning.'82 If cultural literacy is the goal, then educated
lawyers should be familiar with certain cases and episodes of constitutional
American,' one had to share certain racial, religious, or ethnic characteristics." Levinson, supra note
41, at 257.
172 Perea, supra note 82, at 157 (contending that the U.S. Supreme Court viewed "racially different"
others as a threat to the heart of white Anglo-Saxon dominance).
173 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901).
174 Torruella, supra note 3, at 3.
17 lgartua-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 162 (2005) (Torruella, J., dissenting).
76 Francisco Valdes, "We Are Now of the View": Backlash Activism, Cultural Cleansing, and the
Kulturkampf to Resurrect he Old Deal, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 1407, 1458 (2005).
177 Id. at 1457 n.1 10.
.7. Levinson, supra note 41, at 265. Generally speaking, a canon is understood as "a set of
foundational texts that exemplify, guide, and constitute a discipline." Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon
of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 825-26 (2004); see Richard A. Primus, Canon, Anti-Canon,
and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L.J. 243, 253 (1998) (describing the constitutional canon); J.M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 968 (1998)
(asserting that "[t]he study of canons and canonicity is the key to the secrets of a culture and its
characteristic modes of thought").
179 Levinson, supra note 41, at 265-66.
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development in order to participate in serious discussions about them.' For
academic theory purposes, legal academics should confront key cases and
episodes in U.S. constitutional history in order to be taken seriously by the
community of constitutional scholars.184
Levinson contends that Downes v. Bidwell should be included in each of
these canons.' Although most students will not encounter litigation over the
constitutional status of the territories, he submits that Downes furthers the
pedagogical canon because it is an excellent example of legal rhetoric and
reasoning.'86 The justices' debates in Downes are "carried on at a high level of
professional ability, and students can certainly learn a lot about legal rhetoric
from the close study of the various opinions."' Downes points to fundamental
questions not answered in the constitutional text, such as: What actually
constitutes the United States? How is that determined? Where does the notion of
unincorporated territories originate? What are the implications of distinguishing
between states and territories?"'
Levinson submits that learning about Downes would help to construct a
better cultural literacy canon by ensuring that lawyers and citizens "are well
informed about key episodes in American constitutional development."' For
him, "the epic story of American expansionism that pervades our entire 19th-
century history"' 9 0-and Downes's place in it-is a key narrative missing from
the canon's dominant historical storylines of federalism, economic regulation,
civil rights, and civil liberties.'9'
The Insular Cases furthered U.S. decision-makers' purposeful choice at the
close of the nineteenth century to transform the United States into an imperialist
power.'92 For Levinson, Downes also "contains within it a capsule history of
some other crucial chapters in the expansionist saga,"'93 including the Louisiana
Purchase and Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Scott v. Sandford, declaring that
Congress did not have plenary power over U.S. territories.9 4 Levinson also
suggests that Downes should be placed in the context of American racism
.. Id. at 243.
184 id.
i. Levinson, supra note 41, at 248.
186 Id.
197 id.
" Id. at 248-49.
9 [d. at 250.
190 Id. at 252.
191 Levinson, supra note 41, at 251-52.
192 See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
93 Levinson, supra note 41, at 252.
1
9 4 Id. at 252-56.
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alongside Plessy v. Ferguson, Elk v. Wilkins, and anti-Asian immigration
legislation because territorial peoples' otherness was fundamental to the case's
outcome.195 He concludes that Downes, perhaps more than most cases, offers
essential insight into "the interplay of general American political ideologies and
the development of constitutional doctrine."1 96
Finally, Downes's inclusion in the academic theory canon would be
effective "in directing constitutional scholars toward important questions that
have tended to be ignored within contemporary scholarship."'97 For Levinson,
the Insular Cases help constitutional scholars to explain mechanisms of
constitutional change, particularly because the cases resulted from a
"constitutional moment" in which the U.S. Supreme Court forged a
constitutional path that mirrored the 1900 election of imperialist William
McKinley.'9 '
Levinson convincingly argues that Downes should become a part of the
constitutional law canon, but the canon can be elusive. What is or should be part
of the canon?'99 Who decides which are the most important or instructive texts
in a particular field? Editors of casebooks-whose objectives and agendas may
differ significantly-provide perhaps the most crucial gatekeeping function:
they decide which "cases and materials" to include or exclude, and thereby
impact which texts law students study.2 00 What becomes canonical depends on
what one believes is important, but also what one thinks others believe is
important. 201 Different audiences or "interpretive communities" may have
"" Id. at 257-59 (noting that Justice Brown also authored Plessy v. Ferguson, and that Downes and
Plessy "arise out of a common intellectual milieu").
19 6 Id. at 263.
97 Id. at 250.
'9 Id at 264-65 (describing the term "constitutional moment," coined by Bruce Ackerman, as a
phenomenon where "an aroused American public, confronting issues of great import, make a
conscious decision to strike out on transformative constitutional paths").
199 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 178, at 245, 247 (contending that cases "that are important but
normatively disapproved" should more appropriately be considered "as the 'anti-canon,"' and noting
that "[t]he use of a dissenting opinion as if it were a canonical authority indicates that the
constitutional canon must be open to revision").
20 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 178, at 973; see Katherine M. Franke, Homosexuals, Torts, and
Dangerous Things, 106 YALE L.J. 2661, 2661 (1997) (book review) ("[C]asebooks can play a
critical role in the evolution of a field, the creation of a disciplinary rule of recognition, and the
concomitant development of a canon.").
201 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 178, at 979.
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divergent canons and methods of defining them.20 2 And canons, for various
reasons, change over time.203
Perhaps more importantly, most discussions of what should constitute the
canon focus very little on the importance of "looking to the bottom," or adopting
the perspective of those most oppressed. Legal scholar Mari Matsuda implores
law faculties to commit to seeing issues from the viewpoint of the least
privileged.204 In the context of U.S. territorial peoples, looking to the bottom
means, among other things, considering the meaning of self-determination for
those colonized by examining their varied responses to the Insular Cases.
Attentiveness to the proactive claims of those harmed by injustice is an integral
step toward repairing those wrongs.
Historical cases and materials should be included in the canon to show that
the law sometimes sanctions injustice and has lasting negative effects on
individuals and groups. J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson contend that some
cases in the canon are included "to help us learn from America's past misdeeds
and mistakes and to understand how these have irrevocably shaped the world in
which we live today."205 Indeed, "law professors routinely include cases and
materials that are not only badly reasoned, but also unjust, because they are
insensitive to the poor and oppressed, because they justify violations of civil
liberties, or because they are racist or sexist," to reveal to students the racism
and sexism of that canonical text.206 Some scholars posit that the Insular Cases
are not taught in constitutional law for precisely this reason-they reveal the
"brutal" or "dark" side of constitutional decision-making.
As Balkin and Levinson suggest, the effects of the Insular Cases' doctrine
"are still with us today."20 7 Adopting the viewpoint of the least privileged
reveals that the cases have unrecognized, but real, impacts on the self-
determination of those colonized. Thus, whether or not Downes or the other
Insular Cases become a part of an elusive canon, the cases can and ought to be
incorporated into the law school curriculum now. It is also important, however,
202 Id. at 980; Primus, supra note 178, at 252 (noting that "people are likely to answer differently
based not only on their theoretical approach to canonicity but also on their substantive views on the
merits of [a] decision, which in turn may be influenced by their political opinions"); see Mark
Tushnet, The Canon(s) of Constitutional Law: An Introduction, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 187 (2000)
(describing some of the complexities of developing a canon).
203 See David Fontana, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: Schneiderman v.
United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 40 (2002) ("[T]he canon will not necessarily include the same
materials throughout different periods of time. As society and law change, so should the canon.").
20 Matsuda, supra note 27, at 324-25; see Janine Young Kim, Resistance and Transformation: Re-
Reading Mari Matsuda in the Postracial Era, 18 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 35, 37 (2013) ("By turning to
. . . the lived reality of injustice and discrimination, mainstream legal scholars would be able to
develop theories that are i.cher, truer, and more relevant than before.").
205 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 178, at 978.
206 Id. at 982-83.
207 Id. at 1017.
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to not only determine why the Insular Cases should be incorporated into the
canon, but also how these cases should be taught, as Matsuda's "looking to the
bottom" theory suggests.
IV. LOOKING TO THE PERSPECTIVES OF THOSE ON THE BOrrOM: SELF-
DETERMINATION AND REPARATIVE JUSTICE
In her groundbreaking article, Looking to the Bottom, Mari Matsuda urged
us to adopt the perspective of those most oppressed as an essential starting point
for transforming legal discourse on justice.2 08 "[I]n doing so, she and others laid
the foundation for the emergence of Critical Race Theory and for grappling with
the ways that race shaped and continues to shape many dimensions of American
life and law."209 Matsuda calls on us to view "notions of rights and wrong,
justice and injustice," not from an abstract academic philosopher's standpoint,
"but from the position of groups who have suffered through history."2 10 In doing
so, "identifiable normative priorities emerge," and concepts of law are generated
that are "radically different from those generated at the top."2 1' This is because
the oppressed have "the real interest and the most information," and "can speak
most eloquently of a better [world]."2 12 By urging us to look to the experiences,
history, and intellectual tradition of people of color, Matsuda not only "gave
voice to those who had been silenced or ignored," but also "helped to expand the
field of inquiry in standard legal scholarship."213 She therefore influenced
generations of critical race theorists whose scholarship and discourse look to the
experiences of the least privileged to contextualize and give meaning to legal
theory.
Indeed, Matsuda counseled "us to look to the bottom so that the academic's
search for a neat and complete theory is tempered by understanding how those at
the bottom live with duality, ambiguity, and inconsistency."2 14 For critical race
theorists, this duality laid a foundation for understanding oppressed groups'
limited but compelling legal and political challenges to existing social
arrangements.2 15 As Matsuda asserts, this duality gives subordinated people
strength-"[a]pplying the double consciousness consept [sic] to rights rhetoric
allows us to see that the victim of racism can have a mainstream consciousness .
. . as well as a victim's consciousness."216 For her, "[t]hese two viewpoints can
208 See Matsuda, supra note 27.
209 Yamamoto & Serrano, supra note 28, at 71-72.
210 Matsuda, supra note 27, at 325.
211 Id. at 325-26.
212 Id. at 346.
213 Young Kim, supra note 204, at 36.
214 Id. at 42.
215 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Why Law Still Matters: The Dynamics and Political Value of Justice
Litigation 7 (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
216 Matsuda, supra note 27, at 333-34.
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combine powerfully to create a radical constitutionalism that is true to the
radical roots of this country."217
Critical race theorists, therefore, maintain that oppressed groups can have a
profound cynicism about law and legal process while acknowledging the
historical and social role that rights have played in both liberating (even if
imperfectly) and elevating the psyche of subordinated groups.2 18 Rather than a
mere "false consciousness," critical race theorists contend that marginalized
groups possess a "critical consciousness": the subordinated can both
"understand subordination and . . . derive means of liberation from it." 219
Critical race theorists thus recognize that the dual consciousness of those at the
bottom "accommodates both the idea of legal indeterminacy as well as the core
belief in a liberating law that transcends indeterminacy."2 20
In the context of colonized peoples, looking to the bottom is most powerful
when it is linked to the international human rights norm of self-determination.
The self-determination principle, enshrined in the United Nations Charter,
mandates the development of "friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."22 1 Additional
U.N. instruments more fully define the right, including the 1966 Human Rights
Covenants, which provide that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."2 2 2 "[S]elf-
determination is generally accepted as a . . . peremptory norm from which no
deviation is allowed." 223 When a people's right to self-determination is
wrongfully and illegally abrogated, decolonization-"includ[ing] the right to
217 Id. at 334. Matsuda asserts that Frederick Douglass also engaged in this type of "radical
constitutionalism" when he broke from the Garrisonian abolitionists and embraced the Constitution
as a tool to fight against slavery. Id.
218 Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Factless Jurisprudence, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 615, 632
(2003).
`9 Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1763, 1778 (1990); see Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies
Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 312 (1987).
22o Matsuda, supra note 27, at 341; see Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content
ofRacial Distinctiveness in Critical Race Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1864, 1864-65 (1990).
221 U.N. Charter art. 1, 12.
222 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, 1 1, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
173; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1, N 1, Jan. 3, 1976, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 5; see Julian Aguon, On Loving the Maps Our Hands Cannot Hold: Self-Determination
of Colonized and Indigenous Peoples in International Law, 16 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 47, 51 (2011)
("[U]nder international law, self-determination remains a comprehensive, unparsed, and inalienable
right of all peoples to freely choose their political status."); RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 62, at 119
(noting that self-determination "implies the legal or moral right of a people or group ... to determine
its status and associations with other peoples or groups and to fashion the organizing principles of its
social existence").
223 Aguon, supra note 222, at 51.
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form an independent sovereign state of one's own"-is a remedy. 224 In
particular, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands remain non-
self-governing territories that have yet to achieve full self-government.225 The
United States, as the administering power, is required to submit periodic reports
to the U.N. Secretary-General regarding the steps it has taken to move those
territories toward self-government.226
Many scholars contend, however, that for the peoples of the U.S. territories,
the doctrine of territorial incorporation thwarts self-determination efforts.
According to Efrin Rivera Ramos, "[t]he conceptual scheme of the
Insular Cases is entirely incompatible with any notion of self-determination. "227
For him, the Court's Insular Cases discourse presupposes Congress's near
plenary power "to determine the political condition and the civil and political
rights of the people of the acquired territory." 228 Downes's fundamental
principle "that it is the prerogative of the conqueror to decide the destiny of the
conquered"229 legitimized the power relationship that today undermines U.S.
territorial peoples' self-determination capacity.23 0 Constitutional law scholar
Gerald Neuman similarly maintains that "[t]he Insular Cases doctrine was
emphatically not designed for the purpose of accommodating the self-
determination of the people of the territories-it was designed to facilitate ruling
over them."231 According to Neuman, "[t]he doctrine's flexibility allows it to be
used to modify constitutional structures in response to local customs and
preferences,"23 2 such as by allowing territorial provisions that restrict ownership
of land to Indigenous residents, though those modifications serve to deny the
full applicability of constitutional principles in the unincorporated territories.233
On the other hand, legal scholar Christina Duffy Burnett asserts that the
Insular Cases doctrine stands for the proposition of "deannexation" and
224 Id. at 52; see ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 75
(1995).
225 See U.N. Charter art. 73; Non-Self-Governing Territories, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/
en/decolonization/nonselfgovterritories.shtml ( ast visited Sept. 19, 2018).
226 U.N. Charter art. 73e; U.N. Secretary-General, Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories
Transmitted Under Article 73e of the Charter of the United Nations, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/71/68 (Feb. 1,
2016) (providing that reports must be prepared for the U.N. Secretary-General annually and must
include "information relating to the economic, social and educational conditions in the Territories").
227 Rivera Ramos, supra note 3, at 298.
228 id.
229 id.
2 30 Id at 230.
231 Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REv. 1, 13 (2004).
232 id.
233 See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990); Craddick v. Territorial Registrar,
1 Am. Samoa 2d 10 (1980).
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therefore provides a method "to implement the values of self-determination."23 4
By creating the "unincorporated" category, the United States sought to reserve
the right to extricate itself from those territories if necessary.235 Until the Insular
Cases were decided, she argues, it was not clear after the Civil War that the
United States could retreat from its territories.236 Just as the United States can
pull out of the relationship, the territories can do so if they are being denied key
rights and representation.237 In a forthcoming piece, Indigenous Chamoru legal
scholar Julian Aguon further explores the territories' ability, based on the
Insular Cases and international law principles, to throw off the colonial yoke.238
Meaningful decolonization thus entails repairing the damage suffered by
those who have experienced systemic oppression according to their self-shaped
notions of reparation.239 This type of repair, or "reparative justice," focuses on
mending breaches in the polity by healing the persisting wounds of communities
harmed.240 Its goal is to ascertain and respond to groups' self-determined ideas
of injury and remedy in order to "build[] new relationships as focal points for
fostering an interest-convergence among the victims of injustice . . . and society
itself."241 As legal scholar Eric Yamamoto asserts, "[b]ecause the wounds are
the material and psychological harms of injustice, the prescriptions for healing
those wounds must be informed by justice,"242 shaped by both those harmed and
the larger society. Similarly, legal scholar Martha Minow contends that
reparative justice for victims of mass violence should embody the notion of
restorative justice "to repair the harms and to institute future changes to correct
the injustice." 243 For Indigenous legal scholar Rebecca Tsosie, "self-
determination provides the baseline requirement for an effective theory of
reparative justice."244
234 Mary Wood, Insular Cases' Made Puerto Rican Status Unclear, Panel Says, U. VA. SCH. L.





238 E-mail from Julian Aguon to Susan Serrano (Feb. 27, 2018, 1:09 AM HST) (on file with author).
239 Tsosie, supra note 37, at 245.
240 Yamamoto et al., supra note 33, at 16.
241 Id. at 4.
242 
Id. at 39.
243 Tsosie, supra note 37, at 249 (citing MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFrER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 91-117 (1998)).
244 Id. at 253; D. Kapua'ala Sproat, Wai Through Kindwai: Water for Hawai'i's Streams and Justice
for Hawaiian Communities, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 127, 172 (2011) (noting that "a restorative justice
approach informed by principles of self-determination ... [is] particularly apt in light of the ravages
of colonization").
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Reparative justice, informed by principles of self-determination, thus
requires us to pay close attention to the proactive justice claims of those harmed
by the injustice. Legal scholar Carlton Waterhouse maintains that effective
reparative justice efforts should focus on victims' material needs and well-being,
and offer those victims a central role in the design and implementation
of schemes to repair harms to their self-determination. 245 This kind of
"[d]eference to victims respects their rights to personhood and self-
determination."246 In the context of looking to the bottom for U.S. territorial
peoples, the damage to their self-determination should similarly be repaired
according to the colonized peoples' sense of what is needed.
Thus, reparative justice for U.S. territorial peoples may entail repairing
long-standing imbalances of power and agency, and redressing multiple
political, economic, cultural, and social harms. For example, Pedro Malavet
employs a "repair" paradigm to envision ways to construct "local political
power for Puerto Ricans, and to create a viable Puerto Rican economy that
supports real equal opportunity . . . , thus repairing the legacy of political,
economic, and psychological colonization by the United States."247 Similarly,
Ediberto Roman suggests that a transformative reparations effort for the people
of the U.S. territories should first focus on exposure and acknowledgment of the
wrongs committed and "should use the commonalities of wrongs to coalesce and
form formidable political efforts" in a continuing effort to support territorial
peoples' human rights.248
For Indigenous inhabitants of the territories, the preservation of their deep
connections to land (and where applicable, the return of land) is also central to
their self-determination.249 As Indigenous legal scholar Rebecca Tsosie notes,
reparative justice for Indigenous peoples "ought to engage Native normative
frameworks of justice because, for Native peoples, reparative justice is a process
that is 'simultaneously emotional and spiritual, political and social."'25 0 As she
observes, however, no single theory of reparative justice "can fit all cultures, all
245 Waterhouse, supra note 33, at 267-68.
246 Matsuda, supra note 27, at 387, 397 (contending that redress should always look "to victims for
guidance").
247 Pedro A. Malavet, Reparations Theory and Postcolonial Puerto Rico: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 387, 391 (2002).
248 Ediberto Roman, Reparations and the Colonial Dilemma: The Insurmountable Hurdles and Yet
Transformative Benefits, 13 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 369, 383-84 (2002).
249 Tsosie, supra note 37, at 236 (noting that "[r]epatriation of land is central to Indigenous self-
determination, and is fundamentally linked to the political and cultural sovereignty of Indigenous
peoples").
250 Id. at 253 (quoting Rebecca Tsosie, Acknowledging the Past to Heal the Future: The Role of
Reparations for Native Nations, in REPARATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES 43, 43 (Jon Miller
& Rahul Kumar eds., 2007)).
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nations, and all peoples."25 1 Instead, "the theory will differ depending on the
particular historical context and cultural framework that applies."25 2
Thus, we can grasp some of the meanings of self-determination for those
colonized by examining their responses to the legal apparatus, the Insular Cases,
that has harshly shaped their political and social existence-responses that are
both defensive against further encroachment on self-government efforts and
proactively assertive as the foundation for repairing decades of social and
political damage. Because reparative justice requires paying close attention to
proactive justice claims of those harmed by the injustice,253 for colonized
peoples, this means examining their present-day usages of or resistance to the
"teachings" of the Insular Cases.
This examination is important because the way in which a group's history is
framed, and whether it is examined at all, is vital to shaping a group's narrative,
and "can 'determine the power of justice claims or opposition to them."'254 As
such, the near total omission of the Insular Cases and their impacts from law
school courses fosters continued invisibility and discounts territorial peoples'
attempts to craft and employ strategies to remedy their loss of self-
determination.
V. THE INSULAR CASES IN THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM: REVEALING THE
SELF-DETERMINATION PERSPECTIVES OF THOSE MOST AFFECTED
Studying the Insular Cases from the bottom, guided by reparative justice
principles, helps us to understand how those cases still tightly circumscribe U.S.
territorial peoples' sovereignty. For the peoples of the territories, the meaning of
self-determination is complicated by the "democratic deficit"255 that subjects
territorial residents to federal laws but deprives them of meaningful participation
in national political processes. Territorial peoples thus at once seek forms of
self-governance separate from U.S. control and also pursue civil and political
rights within the U.S. paradigm.
A. Five Modern-Day Cases: The Insular Cases'Lasting Impacts on Territorial
Peoples' Self-Determination Efforts
Five present-day cases, each in different ways implicating the Insular
Cases, further reveal territorial peoples' multifaceted self-determination efforts.
Two cases lay bare Puerto Rico's colonial relationship with the United States in
251 Id.
252 Id. at 253-54.
253 Waterhouse, supra note 33, at 267-68.
254 Serrano, supra note 51, at 359 (quoting Eric K. Yamamoto & Catherine Corpus Betts, Disfiguring
Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of Rice v. Cayetano, in
RACE LAW STORIES, supra note 58, at 541, 558).
255 Igartha-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 168 (1st Cir. 2005); see Pedro A. Malavet,
Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 39 (2000).
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both constitutional and statutory contexts. Another underscores American
Samoans' dispute over U.S. citizenship as a source of needed rights on the one
hand or an encroachment on tradition and custom on the other. Yet another
shines light on Indigenous Chamorus' strategic employment of the Insular
Cases to preserve a measure of self-determination. Finally, another exposes the
incongruity of disallowing some territorial residents who formerly lived in one
of the states from voting in U.S. presidential elections, while allowing
individuals overseas who formerly lived in one of the states to do so. Each of
these efforts confronts head-on the lasting legacy of the Insular Cases.
1. The Puerto Rico cases
During its October 2015 term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided two cases
exposing the long-lasting effects of U.S. colonization in Puerto Rico. In Puerto
Rico v. Sanchez Valle, the Court determined that, for purposes of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, Puerto Rico and the United States are not separate
sovereigns.256 In Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cahfornia Tax-Free Trust, the Court
ruled that Puerto Rico's municipalities cannot file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy, but,
at the same time, Puerto Rico cannot enact its own municipal bankruptcy law.257
This Section briefly describes both cases and their impacts.
a. Puerto Rico v. Sdnchez Valle
For some, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle "is the most important case on the
constitutional relationship between Puerto Rico and the United States since the
establishment of the Commonwealth in 1952."258 In 2008, defendants Luis
Sinchez Valle and Jaime G6mez Vdzquez were separately indicted for selling a
firearm without a permit in violation of the Puerto Rico Arms Act of 2000.259
While those charges were pending, federal grand juries indicted the two men,
based on the same transactions, for violations of similar U.S. gun trafficking
statutes.260 Both defendants pleaded guilty to the federal charges and moved to
dismiss the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico charges, arguing that the Puerto Rico
charges violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.261 The
trial courts dismissed the charges, but the Puerto Rico Court of Appeals
reversed.262 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico then reversed the appellate court,
holding that their prosecutions on the Puerto Rico charges violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.263
256 Puerto Rico v. Sinchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1876-77 (2016).
251 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1942 (2016).
258 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Scinchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (No. 15-108).
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The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and held that Puerto Rico and the United
States are not separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.264 In so holding, the Court determined that "sovereignty" in the double
jeopardy context "does not bear its ordinary meaning."26 5 For the Court, "[t]he
degree to which an entity exercises self-governance-whether autonomously
managing its own affairs or continually submitting to outside direction-plays
no role in the analysis."266 Equally unimportant is an entity's "ability to enact
and enforce its own criminal laws"267 or whether it "possesses the usual
attributes, or acts in the common manner, of a sovereign entity."268 Instead, the
Court looks only to the "ultimate source" or "deepest wellsprings" of the entity's
self-governing power.2 69
According to the Court, states and Indian tribes are separate sovereigns
from the federal government because the source of their power is "primeval"-it
pre-existed the formation of the Union.270 In contrast, "the oldest roots of Puerto
Rico's power to prosecute lie in federal soil."27 ' The Court traced the history of
Puerto Rico's relationship with the United States, starting in 1898 when Spain
"ceded" Puerto Rico to the United States, through the next century when the two
"forged a unique political relationship, built on the island's evolution into a
constitutional democracy exercising local self-rule."272
In 1952, Puerto Rico adopted its own constitution and became the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a new and "exceptional" self-governing
entity.273 At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized Puerto Rico as
holding "a measure of autonomy comparable to that possessed by the States."274
However, for the Court, these intervening indicators of Puerto Rico's self-
governance "do[] not break the chain." 275 Therefore, in tracing Puerto Rico's
prosecutorial power "all the way back, [the Court] arrive[d] at the doorstep of
the U.S. Capitol." 276
264 Id. at 1876-77.




2 69 Id. at 1871.
270 Id. at 1875.
271 Sanchez Vale, 136 S. Ct. at 1868.
272 d
273 Id. at 1874.
274 Id. (quoting Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
597 (1976)).
275 Id. at 1876.
276 id.
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Nowhere in the opinion did the Court mention the concept of the
"unincorporated" territory or refer to Puerto Rico as a U.S. colony.277 Nor did it
analyze the Insular Cases themselves,27 8 save a passing reference to Grafton v.
United States,279 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Philippines-
then a U.S. territory-had no power to prosecute a defendant for murder after a
federal court had acquitted him. 280 In a seemingly incongruent fashion, the Court
rejected the applicability of Grafton because "[f]ollowing 1952, Puerto Rico
became a new kind of political entity, . .. governed in accordance with, and
exercising self-rule through, a popularly ratified constitution."281 Nonetheless,
for the Court, the result "ends up the same": the source of Puerto Rico's power
is the U.S. Congress.282
In dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor, rejected the
conclusion that Congress is the ultimate source of Puerto Rico's prosecutorial
power. He questioned the majority's attempt to seek the "furthest-back" power
source.283 "We do not trace Puerto Rico's source of power back to Spain or to
Rome or to Justinian," he wrote, "nor do we trace the Federal Government's
source of power back to the English Parliament or to William the Conqueror or
to King Arthur." 284
He thus urged the Court to consider "the broader context of Puerto Rico's
history."285 For him, "congressional activity and other historic circumstances can
combine to establish a new source of power."286 He noted in particular that, in
response to the adoption of Puerto Rico's constitution, the United States in 1953
reported to the United Nations that Puerto Rico was no longer a non-self-
governing territory.287 The United States' memorandum to the United Nations
declared that Puerto Rico had reached "the full measure of self-government"288
277 Andres Gonzdlez Berdecia, Puerto Rico Before the Supreme Court of the United States:
Constitutional Colonialism in Action, 7 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 80, 112 (2016).
278 Id.
279 Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1873.
2" Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 355 (1907).
281 Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1874.
282 id.
283 Id. at 1878 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
284 id.
285
1 d. at 1880.
286 Id. He also contended that the Court should look to "the practices, actions, statements, and
attitudes" of Congress and Puerto Rico to decide whether Puerto Rico achieved sufficient
sovereignty for double jeopardy purposes. Sdnchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1884 (Breyer, J., dissenting);
see Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Deals a Blow to Puerto Rican Sovereignty, SLATE (June
9, 2016, 2:05 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/newsand-politics/jurisprudence/2016/06/the
supremecourt s_blow to puerto_rican_sovereignty.html.
287 Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1882 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
288 id
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and that "Congress has agreed that Puerto Rico shall have, under [its]
Constitution, freedom from control or interference by the Congress in respect to
internal government and administration." 289 The United Nations thereby
removed Puerto Rico from the list of non-self-governing territories, and the U.N.
General Assembly determined that "the people of the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico have been invested with attributes of political sovereignty which clearly
identify the status of self-government attained by the Puerto Rican people as that
of an autonomous political entity."290 Thus, for Justice Breyer, the "history of
statutes, language, organic acts, traditions, statements, and other actions, taken
by all three branches of the Federal Government and by Puerto Rico" indicated
"that the 'source' of Puerto Rico's criminal law ceased to be the U.S. Congress
and became Puerto Rico itself, its people, and its constitution."2 91
For some, Sinchez Valle drastically altered the long-held belief that Puerto
Ricans had a collective right to self-government.29 2 For others, the outcome
validated what they had consistently argued-Puerto Rico's Commonwealth
status did not alter its political identity as a colony.293 On the one hand, looking
to the bottom reveals valuable protection for criminal defendants in Puerto Rico
against multiple prosecutions for the same misconduct,294 but, on the other, it
unmasks Puerto Rico's glaring lack of "wide-ranging self-rule,"2 95 rooted in part
in the Insular Cases. As discussed below, Puerto Ricans increasingly call on the
United States to repair the enduring imbalance of power between the island and
its overseer,2 96 but many disagree on the precise method to restore their self-
determination.297 Scinchez Valle, along with Puerto Rico v. Franklin California
289 Id. (alteration in original).
2" Id. at 1883.
291 Id. at 1884; see Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Cold War Civil Rights: The Puerto Rican
Dimension, 42 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 423, 432 (2012) (using Derrick Bell's "interest convergence"
theory to assert that the United States allowed Puerto Rico to draft a local constitution, among other
things, "to provide credibility to the United States in its struggle with the Communist Bloc, and to
win the hearts of third world countries in the United Nations").
292 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 35, Sinchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (No. 15-108).
293 See Vann R. Newkirk II, Puerto Rico's Dream, Denied, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/puerto-rico-guam-supreme-court-status/486887. For
more on the political status context underlying the Sdnchez Valle case, see Gonz~lez Berdecia, supra
note 277, at 91-93 (describing the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's change in approach to Puerto Rico's
status after the pro-statehood party filled six seats on that court).
294 Sdnchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. at 1877 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
293 See id. at 1876.
296 See, e.g., Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Governor Cites 'Sharp Contrast' with Island's Overseers,
REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2017, 4:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-oversight
board-idUSKBN1542X3.
297 See, e.g., GonzAlez Berdecia, supra note 277, at 144-45; Cristian Farias, Puerto Rico Is Up in
Arms Because the Obama Administration Basically Just Called It a Colony, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 30, 2015, 3:02 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/puerto-rico-sovereignty-supreme-
court us 56816a76e4b0b958f659eee5; Cristian Farias, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Puerto Rican
Government-And Gives Hope to Puerto Rico, HUFFINGTON POST (June 9, 2016, 2:59 PM),
431
The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice
Tax-Free Trust, described below, shines light on the colonial experience of
millions of Puerto Rico's people under U.S. rule. As attorney Andr6s Gonzilez
Berdecia contends, the two cases "illustrate[] perfectly why Puerto Rico remains
a 21st century colony of the United States."298
b. Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust
In Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, the U.S. Supreme
Court again sharply delineated the limits of Puerto Rico's self-governing power.
Mired in over seventy billion dollars in public debt, Puerto Rico enacted the
Puerto Rico Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, which sought to
enable Puerto Rico's public utilities to restructure their debt.299 Investors
brought separate suits against Puerto Rico and government officials, challenging
the validity of the Act.
In a case involving Puerto Rico's ability to respond to the most severe fiscal
crisis in its history,300 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Chapter 9 of the federal
Bankruptcy Code preempted Puerto Rico's Recovery Act.30 ' Writing for the
majority, Justice Thomas explained that Puerto Rico is not a "State," pursuant to
the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, "for the purpose of defining who
may be a debtor under chapter 9," and therefore it cannot authorize its
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 relief.302 At the same time, it "remains a
'State' for other purposes related to Chapter 9, including that chapter's pre-
emption provision," so its Recovery Act is preempted by federal law.303 Thus,
because Puerto Rico is not a "State," its municipalities cannot file for
bankruptcy under Chapter 9, but because it is a "State," Chapter 9's preemption
provision "bars [it] from enacting its own municipal bankruptcy scheme. . . ."304
The majority viewed the case as one of simple statutory construction: "The
plain text of the Bankruptcy Code begins and ends our analysis."30s Any
mention of the Insular Cases was conspicuously absent. However, the Court
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/supreme-court-puerto-rico-us57597cc5e4b00f97fba768e2;
Rafael Bernal, Puerto Rico's Representative Makes Renewed Push for Statehood, HILL (Jan. 6,
2017, 9:03 PM), http://thehill.com/atino/313150-puerto-ricos-representative-makes-renewed-push-
for-statehood.
298 Gonzalez Berdecia, supra note 277, at 128.
299 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1943 (2016).
300 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938 (No. 15-233).
301 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1949.
302 Id. at 1942. On March 21, 1984, Senator Strom Thurmond inexplicably proposed an amendment
to Section 101 of Title 11, which Congress passed. It read: "'State' includes the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of defining who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this
title." Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 349 (1st Cir. 2015) (Torruella, J.,
concurring).
303 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1942.
304 id.
301 Id. at 1946.
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could not have reached such a straightforward result unquestionably affirming
Congress's plenary power over Puerto Rico without reliance-however
implicitly-on the Insular Cases doctrine.
In dissent, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, criticized the
majority for failing to read the statute in the context of the overall statutory
scheme.306 For Justice Sotomayor, "[t]he structure of the Code and the language
and purpose of [the preemption provision] demonstrate that Puerto Rico's
municipal debt restructuring law should not be read to be prohibited by Chapter
9."307 Instead, she wrote that the preemption provision "by its terms presupposes
that Chapter 9 applies only to States who have the power to authorize their
municipalities to invoke its protection."" Therefore, "[b]ecause Puerto Rico's
municipalities cannot pass through the [provision governing who may be a
debtor] gateway to Chapter 9, nothing in the operation of a Chapter 9 case
affects Puerto Rico's control over its municipalities."3 09
Justice Sotomayor also criticized the majority for ignoring the real-world
impacts on the Puerto Rican people and for "reject[ing] contextual analysis in
favor of a syllogism.""'0 She contended that "[p]re-emption cases may seem like
abstract discussions of the appropriate balance between state and federal power[,
b]ut they have real-world consequences. "" She warned that preemption would
imperil public services like electricity, drinking water, roads, and public
transportation.1 2 She then acknowledged that Puerto Rico would be "powerless"
to avert this "looming 'humanitarian crisis."'" For these reasons, she stated that
"[s]tatutes should not easily be read as removing the power of a government to
protect its citizens."314
Justice Sotomayor's call to heed "real-world consequences" elevated the
perspective of those most affected: Puerto Rico's people. For her, the majority's
decision left Puerto Rico's government powerless to exercise a measure of self-
governance to assist its people in a humanitarian crisis. That humanitarian crisis
was triggered in part when the U.S. government phased out tax incentives for
U.S. corporations operating in Puerto Rico, causing a recession.' Severe
306 Id. at 1953 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
3m1 Id. at 1949.
308 Id. at 1952.
3 Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. at 1952 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
310Ild at 1953.




"' ANNE 0. KRUEGER ET AL., PUERTO Rico-A WAY FORWARD 4-14 (2015),
www.bgfpr.com/documents/PuertoRicoAWayForward.pdf. Much of Puerto Rico's debt began
accumulating in 1993 after the U.S. government removed tax incentives for large U.S. corporations
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government cuts to education and healthcare directly affected families who
relied on government services.316 Public schools were closed, public workers'
benefits were cut, "the sales tax was increased to 11.5%,"317 and the Department
of Health suffered $135 million in budget cuts from 2011 to 2015."'
Soon after Franklin California Tax-Free Trust was decided, Congress
passed and President Obama signed the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management,
and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA"-ironically, "promise" in Spanish),
which gave sweeping power to a seven-member financial oversight board to
take over negotiations with Puerto Rico's creditors."' Among other things, the
board has the power to decide which projects are funded, to approve budgets,
and to veto debt issuances, without regard to Puerto Rico's constitution or the
decisions of Puerto Rico's government.320 The oversight board's seven members
are appointed by the President of the United States,32' and Puerto Rico's
Governor (or designee) is only an ex officio member.322
Many commentators argue that Puerto Rico's inability to restructure its own
debt and the concomitant enactment of PROMESA are manifestations of U.S.
colonialism that negatively impact those already at the bottom.323 PROMESA
requires "the reduction of the federal minimum wage from $7.25 to $4.25 an
hour for workers 25 years old and younger," unchangeable by Puerto Rico's
with operations in Puerto Rico. See Deborah S. DiPiero, Note, Puerto Rico 's Need for Corporate
Incentives Following the 1996 Amendment to Section 936, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 549, 550 (1997).
Puerto Rico's economy fell into recession, but the government continued to issue municipal bonds to
enable it to function. See GonzAlez Berdecia, supra note 277277, at 115-16; Juan GonzAlez, Puerto
Rico's $123 Billion Bankruptcy Is the Cost of U.S. Colonialism, INTERCEPT (May 9, 2017, 8:23
AM), https://theintercept.com/2017/05/09/puerto-ricos- I 23-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-cost-of-u-s-
colonialism (reporting that Puerto Rico's fiscal woes stem from predatory and illegal bond deals
made between Wall Street firms and Puerto Rico's political leaders).
316 For anecdotal stories about how the budget cuts affected individuals' lives, see Mary Williams
Walsh, A Surreal Life on the Precipice in Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/business/dealbook/life-in-the-miasma-of-puerto-ricos-debt.html, and
Catherine Morris, The Future of Puerto Rican Education, ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/puerto-rico-economy-education-declines/408277.
317 DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON NAT. RES., BRUISED AND BITTEN: How MAJOR
SPENDING CUTS IN PUERTO RICo HAVE LEFT THE ISLAND VULNERABLE TO ZIKA 2 (2016), http://
democrats-naturalresources.house.gov/imo/medialdoc/Zika%20ReportPuerto%2ORico.pdf
' Id. at 8.
39 Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114-187, §§ 2141-
52, 130 Stat. 549 (2016).
320 Representative Ra6l Grijalva called the bill's lack of Puerto Rican oversight "another
infringement on the sovereignty of the people of Puerto Rico." Vann R. Newkirk II, Puerto Rico
Belongs to Congress, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2016/06/puerto-rico-news-ruling-promesa/486392.
321 About Us, FIN. OVERSIGHT & MGMT. BOARD FOR P.R., https://oversightboard.pr.gov/fombteam
(last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
322 Id.; Gillian B. White, Puerto Rico's Problems Go Way Beyond Its Debt, ATLANTIC (July 1,
2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/puerto-rico-promesa-debt/489797.
323 E.g., GonzAlez, supra note 315.
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Governor without the oversight board's approval.32 4 In January 2017, the
oversight board ordered Puerto Rico's Governor "to present a plan that would
generate $4.5 billion a year in revenue or savings through 2019" and include
drastic cuts to healthcare and higher education.3 25 The board recommended the
closure of 300 public schools and teacher furloughs, and, as of May 2017, 178
schools were slated for closure and thousands of teachers' contracts were not
renewed.326 It also recommended a $450 million cut over four years to Puerto
Rico's public university, though Puerto Rico's Governor has proposed a lesser,
though still dire, cut of $241 million, as $450 million "would be a 'dramatic
negative' that would be 'difficult for the university to absorb."'327 In addition,
$850 million in Affordable Care Act funds are slated for elimination in 2018.328
Puerto Rico's Governor acknowledged that "[t]here has to be sacrifice
everywhere," but underscored that low-income individuals without healthcare
and parents of public schoolchildren would be the hardest hit.329 This is
particularly alarming in light of Puerto Rico's twelve percent unemployment and
forty-five percent poverty rates, 330 the catastrophic impacts of Hurricane
Maria,331 and ongoing massive emigration to the continental United States.332
324 Juan C. Ddvila, PROMESA: Puerto Rico s "Restructure" at $4.25 an Hour, HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 6, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/juan-c-davila/promesa-puerto-ricos-rest-b_
10615610.html.
325 Jim Wyss, Will Puerto Rico Become the Newest Star on the American Flag?, MIAMI HERALD
(Feb. 23, 2017, 12:28 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/
article128782174.html.
326 Frances Robles, Puerto Rico 's Debt Crisis Claims Another Casualty: Its Schools, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/us/puerto-rico-debt-schools-close.html?_r-0;
Corey Mitchell, Puerto Rico Shutters Scores ofSchools Amid Financial Crisis, EDUC. WK. (May 30,
2017), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2017/05/31/puerto-rico-shutters-scores-of-schools-amid.
html (noting that the school closures would impact 30,000 students).
327 Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Governor Aims to Pare Cuts at Public University, REUTERS (Mar. 20,
2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt-upr/puerto-rico-govemor-aims-
to-pare-cuts-at-public-university-idUSKBN16R290 (quoting Moody's Investors Service).
328 Statement of Oversight Board in Connection with PROMESA Title III Petition at 2, In re
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 3:17-cv-01578 (D.P.R. May 3, 2017).
329 Frances Robles, Puerto Ricans Face 'Sacrifice Everywhere' on an Insolvent Island, N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/06/us/puerto-rico-insolvency-business-owners-
anxiety.html (quoting Puerto Rico's Governor Ricardo A. Rossell6) (reporting that up to 400,000
people would lose their health plans and that many public services would be unavailable).
"o DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON NAT. RES., supra note 317, at 2.
33. Frances Robles et al., In Battered Puerto Rico, Governor Warns of a Humanitarian Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/puerto-rico-maria-fema-disaster-
.html?r-0.
332 Jens Manuel Krogstad, Puerto Ricans Leave in Record Numbers for Mainland U.S., PEW RES.
CTR. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/14/puerto-ricans-leave-in-
record-numbers-for-mainland-u-s.
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Puerto Rico is now in the midst of a massive bankruptcy-like restructuring
process pursuant to PROMESA.333 As creditors battle over what is due,
observers point to the colonial conditions laid bare by Puerto Rico's economic
crisis.334 One commentator observed that PROMESA "continues to treat Puerto
Rico and its debt as an anomaly-neither state, nor municipality, which leaves it
in a nebulous space . ... ."I" Many Puerto Ricans worry that their futures are in
the hands of a faraway oversight board and federal judge,336 who may not "take
into account basic essentials of safety, health and education."337 Others criticize
the across-the-board cuts to salaries, hours, pensions, education, and services, as
well as the looming choices Puerto Ricans will have to make between basic
necessities like housing and healthcare.3 8
In light of Puerto Rico's re-illuminated colonial status, Puerto Ricans have
called for meaningful repair of the long-standing harms of injustice. Although
all focus on redressing multiple political, economic, and social harms stemming
from U.S. colonization, each group has a different approach. For example, some
have renewed their calls for statehood.339 Puerto Rico's Governor Ricardo
Rossell6, a statehood supporter, approved a non-binding referendum allowing
voters to choose between statehood or independence/free association. 340
Connecting Puerto Rico's financial crisis with its colonial status, Governor
1 See Title III Petition for Covered Territory or Covered Instrumentality, In re Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico, No. 3:17-cv-01578 (D.P.R. May 3, 2017). On May 3, 2017, the federal fiscal oversight
board filed for bankruptcy-like protection for Puerto Rico under Title III of PROMESA, in what is
being called the largest municipal bankruptcy case in U.S. history. Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto
Rico Declares a Form of Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/03/business/dealbook/puerto-rico-debt.html?_r-0 (noting that Puerto Rico holds $74 billion
in bond debt and $49 billion in pension obligations).
3 E.g., GonzAlez, supra note 315; see Press Release, Senator Bob Menendez, Menendez Speaks in
Opposition to House Puerto Rico Bill (May 24, 2016), https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-
events/press/menendez-speaks-in-opposition-to-house-puerto-rico-bilI (ca ling PROMESA "blatant
neocolonialism" because it strips Puerto Rico of control over its future).
335 White, supra note 322.
336 Pursuant to PROMESA, U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts appointed Judge Laura Taylor
Swain of the Southern District of New York to oversee Puerto Rico's case. Matthew Goldstein,
Judge in Puerto Rico's Debt Lawsuit Handled Major Financial Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/business/dealbook/judge-puerto-rico-case.html?r-0.
33 Robles, supra note 326 (quoting teachers' union leader Emilio Nieves Torres).
338 Robles, supra note 329; see Statement of Oversight Board in Connection with PROMESA Title
HI Petition at 1-4, In re Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, No. 3:17-cv-01578 (D.P.R. May 3, 2017)
(describing impacts on the health, safety, and welfare of the Puerto Rican people in connection with
PROMESA).
39 See, e.g., Bernal, supra note 297; Vann R. Newkirk II, Testing Territorial Limits, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/territorial-limits/475935. The
specific positions and arguments of the New Progressive Party (who favor statehood), the Popular
Democratic Party (who favor Commonwealth status), and the Puerto Rican Independence Party
(who favor independence) are beyond the scope of this Article.
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Rossell6 argued, "If we compare ourselves with the other 50 states, the
fundamental difference is our lack of rights, our lack of participation, and our
lack of resources to move our jurisdiction forward. . . . Our colonial condition
creates a situation of incredible inequality."3 41
At the same time, others continue to push for independence.3 42 For example,
Maria de Lourdes Santiago, a senator from the Puerto Rican Independence
Party, warned that "[s]even unelected people are going to be controlling our
lives," much like "a dictatorship," and called for "a legitimate process of
decolonization."3 43 Others who had embraced Puerto Rico's Commonwealth
status underscore Puerto Rico's lack of meaningful self-rule.34 4 In 2016, Puerto
Rico's then-Governor Alejandro Garcia Padilla, a Commonwealth supporter,
told the U.N. Special Committee on Decolonization that the United States must
fulfill the promises it made to the United Nations in 1953, when it requested that
Puerto Rico be removed from the list of non-self-governing territories.345 He
argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's Franklin California Tax-Free Trust
decision directly contradicted the United States' stance that Puerto Rico was not
a colony3 46: "Starting from the right of self-determination of the Puerto Rican
people, . . . equality and respect must exist in the relationship between Puerto
Rico and the United States based on the will of both peoples, and not one over
the other."4 The committee "call[ed] on the Government of the United States to
assume its responsibility to expedite a process that would allow the people of
341 Wyss, supra note 325 ("The United States is always demanding democracy in other parts of the
world, ... but it seems to me it doesn't have the moral standing to demand democracy in Venezuela
or Cuba if it won't extend [democracy] to 3.5 million of its own citizens." (alteration in original)
(quoting Governor Rossell6)).
342 Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rico's Financial Woes Revive Calls for Independence, N.Y.TIMES
(Aug. 16, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/17/business/puerto-rico-rafael-cancel-miranda.
html?_r-0.
34 Id. A White House spokesperson acknowledged that "the people of Puerto Rico want the issue of
status to be resolved," and reiterated President Obama's "commit[ment] to the principle of self-
determination for the people of Puerto Rico." Id.




346 Emile Schepers, U.N. Decolonization Committee Lambasts U.S. on Puerto Rico, PEOPLE'S
WORLD (June 24, 2016, 12:06 PM), http://peoplesworld.org/u-n-decolonization-committee-
lanbasts-u-s-on-puerto-rico; see Williams Walsh, supra note 342.
347 Puerto Rican Governor Asks UN to Support Self-Determination, TELESUR (June 21, 2016),
https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Puerto-Rican-Governor-Asks-UN-to-Support-Self-Determinati
on-20160621-0021.html. Governor Garcia Padilla asked the committee to "put the case of Puerto
Rico to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization and to the Human Rights
Council." Id.
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Puerto Rico to exercise fully their right to self-determination and
independence."348
While the political status debate is waged in Puerto Rico and Washington,
D.C., Puerto Ricans continue to protest PROMESA as an extension of U.S.
colonialism and decry the harsh impacts on those most in need.349 At bottom,
their calls underscore their efforts to secure a measure of self-governance and
"their determination to have control of their own destiny."350
2. Tuaua v. United States
Tuaua v. United States explicitly employs the Insular Cases framework to
resolve a clash between a small group of American Samoans on the U.S.
continent who desire U.S. citizenship and American Samoans in American
Samoa who do not.3 51 In Tuaua, the plaintiffs were American Samoans living on
the U.S. continent, who are non-citizen nationals and ineligible for civil service
jobs.352 They filed suit arguing that those bom in American Samoa are citizens
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.53 In 2015, the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that in light of the Insular Cases and
American Samoa's own wishes, American Samoans are not entitled to birthright
citizenship.35 4 In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.5
Acknowledging that the Insular Cases "may now be deemed politically
incorrect," the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge
Brown, noted that the Cases' "framework remains both applicable and of
pragmatic use in assessing the applicability of rights to unincorporated
territories." 6 The court, therefore, applied the Insular Cases' framework to
determine whether the right to birthright citizenship is "fundamental" for
348 Press Release, Special Comm. on Decolonization, Special Committee on Decolonization
Approves Text Calling Upon United States Government to Expedite Self-Determination Process for
Puerto Rico, U.N. Press Release GA/COL/3296 (June 20, 2016), http://www.un.org/
press/en/201 6/gacol3296.doc.htm.
39 Luna Olavarria Gallegos, Puerto Rican Activists Shut Down the First Scheduled PROMESA
Conference in Son Juan, REMEZCLA (Aug. 31, 2016, 7:50 PM), http://remezcla.com/
culture/promesa-conference-protest-san-juan (noting that Puerto Ricans from all political
persuasions and walks of life took to the streets to protest PROMESA); see Gonzilez, supra note
315 (arguing that the Franklin California Tax-Free Trust decision and the PROMESA oversight
board removed Puerto Rico's "mask of self-governance" and that the U.S. government must "finally
decide whether to completely annex Puerto Rico as the 51st state or acknowledge that it still remains
a distinct nation, with the right to its own sovereignty and independence").
310 Olavarria Gallegos, supra note 349 (quoting protestor Eli Jacobs-Fantauzzi).
' Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 301-02 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
3" Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88;91 (D.D.C. 2013).
3 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 301.
354 Id. at 302.
35s Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016).
356 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 307.
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persons born in the U.S. territories.3 5 ' According to the court, "fundamental" has
a distinct meaning in the territorial context: It applies "only to the narrow
category of rights and 'principles which are the basis of all free government."'ss
In contrast, "non-fundamental" rights are "those artificial, procedural, or
remedial rights that . . . are nonetheless idiosyncratic to the American social
compact or to the Anglo-American tradition ofjurisprudence."359
The court declared that it was "unconvinced a right to be designated a
citizen at birth under the jus soli tradition, rather than a non-citizen national, is a
'sine qua non for "free government"' or otherwise fundamental under the
Insular Cases' constricted understanding of the term."3 60 The court explained
that it must ask "which guarantees of the Constitution should apply in view of
the particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives which Congress had before it." 36 ' In other words, it must query
"whether the circumstances are such that recognition of the right to birthright
citizenship would prove 'impracticable and anomalous,' as applied to
contemporary American Samoa."3 62
The court determined that "the American Samoan people have not formed a
collective consensus in favor of United States citizenship. In part this reluctance
stems from unique kinship practices and social structures inherent to the
traditional Samoan way of life, including those related to the Samoan system of
communal land ownership."6 The court pointed to aiga, or extended families,
who "communally own virtually all Samoan land," and matais, or chiefs, who
"have authority over which family members work what family land and where
the nuclear families within the extended family will live."3 64 The government of
. Id. at 307-09.
3 Id. at 308 (alteration in original) (quoting Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147 (1904)).
359 id
3 Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Hodel,
830 F.2d 374, 386 n.72 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
361 Id. at 309 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957)).
362 Tzlaua, 788 F.3d at 309 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74).
363 Id. Fa'a Samoa is "the Samoan way" or the "essence of being Samoan." Uilisone Falemanu Tua,
A Native's Call for Justice: The Callfor the Establishment of a Federal District Court in American
Samoa, 11 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 246, 267 (2009). It involves "a 'unique attitude toward fellow
human beings, unique perceptions of right and wrong, the Samoan heritage, and fundamentally the
aggregation of everything that the Samoans have learned . . . .' Id. (quoting Jeffrey B. Teichert,
Resisting Temptation in the Garden of Paradise: Preserving the Role of Samoan Custom in the Law
ofAmerican Samoa, 3 GoNz. J. INT'L L. 2, 3 (2000)).
3 Tuoua, 788 F.3d at 309 (quoting King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); see
Sean Morrison, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: American Samoa and the Last U.S. Nationals, 41
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 71, 78-81 (2013) (explaining that fa'a Samoa is comprised of "three pillars":
(1) aiga, which is an extended familial system; (2) communally held land, which accounts for over
ninety percent of American Samoa's land; and (3) matai, which is the hierarchy of chiefs that
oversee the aiga and the communal land). See generally Arnold H. Leibowitz, American Samoa:
Decline ofa Culture, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 220 (1980) (summarizing the transformation of culture
in American Samoa).
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American Samoa was "concem[ed] that the extension of United States
citizenship to the territory could potentially undermine these aspects of the
Samoan way of life."365 Specifically, it feared that "the extension of citizenship
could result in greater scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, imperiling American Samoa's traditional, racially-
based land alienation rules."366 The court thus believed "it anomalous to impose
citizenship over the objections of the American Samoan people themselves, as
expressed through their democratically elected representatives."3 67
Calling the United States' imposition of citizenship on American Samoa
"an exercise of paternalism--if not overt cultural imperialism,"368 the court
refused to "forcibly impose a compact of citizenship-with its concomitant
rights, obligations, and implications for cultural identity-on a distinct and
unincorporated territory of people, in the absence of evidence that a majority of
the territory's inhabitants endorse such a tie and where the territory's
democratically elected representatives actively oppose such a compact."369
Citing the U.N. Charter, the court determined that it could "envision little that is
more anomalous, under modem standards, than the forcible imposition of
citizenship against the majoritarian will." 370
On the one hand, it is easy to understand how the denial of U.S. citizenship
to American Samoans contributes to their marginalization. American Samoans
are unable to obtain civil service jobs and certain military positions, must pay
for and navigate the naturalization process if they desire U.S. citizenship, are
disadvantaged in sponsoring foreign-national family members for immigration
visas, are denied the right to vote in national, state, and local elections, cannot
serve on juries, and experience a feeling of otherness and exclusion.37'
Indeed, many civil rights attorneys and scholars viewed the denial of
birthright U.S. citizenship as a stark violation of American Samoans'
constitutional rights.37 2 Many amicus curiae briefs supporting Tuaua's writ of




1 d. at 312.
369 Id. at 311; see Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Needs to Settle Birthright Citizenship,
SLATE (June 6, 2016, 4:39 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2016/06/the-supreme-court-
needs-to-settle-birthright-citizenship.html (comparing the paternalism in Tuaua and the Insular
Cases).
370 Tuaua, 788 F.3d at 311.
37 Brief of League of United Latin American Citizens et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 19-24, Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (2016) (No. 15-981) [hereinafter Brief
of League of United Latin American Citizens et al.].
372 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Citizenship for American Samoans, L.A.
TIMES (June 13, 2016, 12:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-court-samoans-20160613-
snap-story.html; Pema Levy, A Federal Appeals Court Just Denied Birthright Citizenship to
[21:2018]440
Elevating the Perspectives of US Territorial Peoples
certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court reflect this view. For example, a brief by
citizenship scholars contends "that the United States government cannot assert
authority over its territories and demand allegiance from individuals born on
United States soil without also recognizing that, by definition and common-law
tradition, those individuals are entitled to the rights and privileges enjoyed by all
citizens of the United States."37 3 The brief of the League of United Latin
American Citizens, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, and the National Asian
Pacific American Bar Association similarly argues that American Samoans are
wrongfully being "denied U.S. citizenship based on racial and cultural
stereotypes."374 Other commentators frame the issue as one simply of "the insult
of second-class status and the injury of uncertainty [with respect to citizenship],"
and describe the American Samoan government's concerns as "more
emotionally than legally compelling.""'
On the other hand, however, looking to the bottom reveals that many
American Samoans-as an exercise of their right to self-determination-rightly
do not desire U.S. citizenship. As reflected in the brief of the government of
American Samoa and Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoans
are concerned that U.S. citizenship will invite further scrutiny of their way of
American Samoans Using Racist Caselaw, MOTHER JONES (June 5, 2015, 7:55 PM), http://www.
motherjones.com/mojo/2015/06/appeals-court-denies-birthright-citizenship-american-samoans.
1 Brief of Citizenship Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17, Tuaua, 136 S. Ct.
2461 (No. 15-981); see Citizenship Plaintiffs Say 14th Amendment All that Matters, SAMOA NEWS
(Apr. 30, 2014, 4:31 PM), http://www.samoanews.com/citizenship-plaintiffs-say-14th-amendment-
all-matters; Gene Demby, How Birthright Citizenship for American Samoans Could Threaten 'The
Samoan Way,' NPR (Feb. 24, 2015, 2:52 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/
2015/02/24/388716342/how-birthright-citizenship-for-american-samoans-could-destroy-the-samoan-
way (quoting plaintiff Leneuoti Tuaua as saying that "[i]fwe are equal in times of war to serve in the
U.S. Armed Forces, we should be equal to others born in the United States when it comes to
citizenship").
374 Brief of League of United Latin American Citizens et al., supra note 371, at 24; see Brief for
Scholars of Constitutional Law and Legal History as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 15-16,
Tuaua, 136 S. Ct. 2461 (No. 15-981) (arguing that the Insular Cases hould not apply because "the
antiquated notions of racial inferiority and imperial expansionism on which those cases are based
have no place in modem constitutional analysis"); Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Are the
Insular Cases Still Binding, After a Century?, NAT'L CONST. CTR. (June 17, 2016), http://blog.
constitutioncenter.org/201 6/06/constitution-check-are-the-insular-cases-still-binding-after-a-century
(reporting on modern-day criticisms of the Insular Cases).
3 Christina Duffy Ponsa, Are American Samoans American?, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/08/opinion/are-american-samoans-american.html?_r-0; see Citizenship
Is an Individual Right Says Alailima, SAMOA NEWS (July 13, 2012, 6:58 PM), http://www.
samoanews.com/citizenship-individual-right-says-alailima (contending that the right to U.S.
citizenship is an individual right that does not implicate questions related to the preservation of
Samoan land or culture); Complaint, supra note 15 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause confers upon
American Samoans birthright citizenship). Residents of the U.S. Virgin Islands closely followed the
Tuaua litigation because of its potential impact on their citizenship rights. See Emice Gilbert,
Citizenship Is Not a Fundamental Right of Virgin Islanders, Obama Administration Says, V.I.
CONSORTIUM (Aug. 18, 2014), http://viconsortium.com/virgin-islands-2/citizenship-is-not-a-funda
mental-right-of-virgin-islanders-obama-administration-says.
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life and encroachment on local government."6 For example, the brief argues that
judicial imposition of birthright citizenship "would have unintended negative
consequences for" American Samoa's culture and tradition, which Congress has
protected for over a century.77 It contends particularly that fa'a Samoa "would
likely face heightened scrutiny under the United States Constitution . . . ," and
the communal land system that "is protected by Samoan law restricting the sale
of community land to anyone with less than fifty percent racial Samoan
ancestry" could be threatened.17 1
The brief also maintains that "[tlhe imposition of birthright citizenship
would upset a political process that ensures self-determination for the people of
unincorporated territories."3 79 It argues that the Insular Cases allow American
Samoa and Congress together "to maintain a deliberate distance between the
territory and the law of the United States" to protect American Samoa's cultural
autonomy.380 It also argues that if this framework is upended by a novel
extension of the Citizenship Clause to American Samoa, "new challenges to
aspects of thefa 'a Samoa will be subject to new analysis consistent with newly
articulated constitutional principles." '
Arguing for the retention of the Insular Cases and against U.S. citizenship
may seem counterintuitive, but not surprising in light of the deep connections
American Samoans have to their Indigenous traditions and culture. "The
communal land and matai systems are such pillars of the cultural system that
there is a widespread fear that any change to the political structure may affect
their durability." 382 Many believe that "[o]nce the system of land ownership is
put in jeopardy, 'the whole fiber, the whole pattern of the Samoan way of life
will be forever destroyed.',38  To that end, American Samoans "have potentially
given up many rights and benefits for which they would otherwise be eligible"
in order to maintain their ability to practice their culture and traditions as they
see fit. 384
376 Brief for Intervenors or, in the Alternative, Amici Curiae the American Samoa Government and
Congressman Eni F.H. Faleomavaega at 1, Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(No. 13-5272) [hereinafter Brief for Intervenors].
377 Id. at 23.
37 Id. at 26.
379 Id. at 32.
380 Id.
3 Id. at 30; see Eni Says Citizenship Question Should Be Decided by the People, Not the Courts,
SAMOA NEWS (Nov. 19, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://www.samoanews.com/eni-says-citizenship-question-
should-be-decided-people-not-courts ("If the majority of American Samoans want to become
birthright citizens, I will work with Congress to grant citizenship to people born in American
Samoa." (quoting Congressman Faleomavaega Eni)).
382 Morrison, supra note 364, at 81.
3 Id. (quoting Haleck v. Lee, 4 Am. Samoa 519, 551 (1964)). "[A] threat to the matai hierarchy
would undermine the very social fabric of the nation, which would in turn dissolve the aiga." Id.
384 Id.
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It is also not surprising in view of the gradual dismantling of Indigenous
sovereignty in the territories. For example, in the Davis v. Commonwealth
Election Commission case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's decision to strike down a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands law restricting voting in certain elections to "persons of Northern
Marianas descent.""' The law specified that only those of Northern Marianas
descent could vote on proposed constitutional amendments that govern
restrictions on the alienation of land to Indigenous Chamorros and
Carolinians.' Such voting limitations were put in place to protect the Northern
Mariana Islands' ancestry-based land-alienation provisions.87
Although the Ninth Circuit previously upheld the Northern Mariana Islands'
ancestry-based land-alienation laws by recognizing that "[t]he Bill of Rights was
not intended . . . to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native cultures,"" the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Davis reveals that threats to Indigenous practices in
the territories persist. American Samoa and its people thus seek to preserve their
profound connections to their land as a crucial component of their self-
determination. For them, this means maintaining the status quo-as is their self-
determined right-in order to avoid further scrutiny and gradual encroachment
on their Indigenous ways of life.
3. Davis v. Guam
In Davis v. Guam, looking to the bottom reveals seemingly counterintuitive
attempts to proactively use the Insular Cases as a shield against reverse
discrimination attacks. In 2011, Arnold Davis, a white resident of Guam, sued
Guam in federal district court, alleging that the territory unlawfully
discriminated against him when it prohibited him from registering to vote in a
political status plebiscite that limited eligibility to "Native Inhabitants of
Guam." 8 "Guam law directs the territory's Commission on Decolonization to
'ascertain the intent of the Native Inhabitants of Guam as to their future political
relationship with the United States of America."'390 It also provides for a future
plebiscite in which "Native Inhabitants of Guam"-individuals who became
U.S. citizens by virtue of the 1950 Organic Act of Guam and their
3 Davis v. Commonwealth Election Comm'n, 844 F.3d 1087, 1089-90 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that
the voting limitation was race-based and violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
"Persons of Northern Marianas descent" refers to the Northern Mariana Islands' Indigenous
Chamorros and Carolinians. Id. at 1090.
386 Id.
1 Brief for Intervenors, supra note 376, at 28.
3 Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990); see Craddick v. Territorial Registrar, I
Am. Samoa 2d 10 (1980) (upholding American Samoa's ancestry-based restriction on the alienation
of land).
39 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 1.
3 Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311, 1313 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting I GUAM CODE ANN. § 2105). The
Commission on Decolonization was established "for the Implementation and Exercise of Guam Self-
Determination for the Native Inhabitants of Guam." I GUAM CODE ANN. § 2104.
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descendants-will choose between independence, free association with the
United States, or statehood.39' "Guam will conduct the plebiscite if and when 70
percent of eligible Native Inhabitants register." 392 The Commission on
Decolonization will then "transmit the plebiscite's results to the President,
Congress and the United Nations .. . "39
Davis alleged that Guam's law racially discriminated against him in
violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Fifteenth Amendment, the Voting Rights Act, and the Organic
Act of Guam.394 The U.S. District Court for the District of Guam dismissed the
case for lack of standing and ripeness.395 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded.3 96
On remand, in his motion for summary judgment, Davis denied the
existence of colonization's harms to Guam's Indigenous Chamorros.3 97 For him,
Guam cannot articulate "a compelling state interest to justify its discriminatory
voting scheme" because it cannot show "that Native Inhabitants of Guam are
entitled to reparations for any alleged wrongs committed against them as a
race."3 98 For the conservative advocacy group representing Davis, the Center for
Individual Rights, Chamorros are instead a "favored" race above all others-the
voting limitation is a "tactic" waged by Chamorros to "build[] a racial identity
for a favored 'native' race in opposition to 'other' races."399
It is significant that a white U.S. citizen is once again claiming reverse
discrimination to dismantle a benefit for "Native Inhabitants" in the style of Rice
v. Cayetano, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Native Hawaiian-
31' Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 4. The law defines "Native
Inhabitants of Guam" as "those persons who became U.S. Citizens by virtue of the authority and
enactment of the 1950 Guam Organic Act and descendants of those persons." 1 GUAM CODE ANN. §
2102. The 1950 Guam Organic Act granted citizenship to:
(1) Spanish subjects who inhabited Guam on April 11, 1899, when Spain
ceded Guam to the United States in the Treaty of Paris (and their children); (2)
persons who were born on Guam and resided there on April I1, 1899 (and
their children); and (3) persons born on Guam on or after April 11, 1899,
when Guam was subject to U.S. jurisdiction.
Davis, 785 F.3d at 1313 n.1; see Organic Act of Guam of 1950,48 U.S.C. § 1421 (2012).
392 Davis, 785 F.3d at 1313.
393 id.
39 4 Id. at 1314.
395 id.
396 Id. at 1316.
3" Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment at 17-18, Davis v. Guam,
No. 1:11-cv-00035 (D. Guam Oct. 30, 2015).
398 Id.
399 Davis v. Guam, CTR. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS., https://www.cir-usa.org/cases/davis-v-guam (last
visited Sept. 19, 2018).
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only voting limitation was an unlawful proxy for race.400 But perhaps most
significant about the Davis case is Guam's strategic use of the Insular Cases
framework to advance a limited measure of self-determination for Chamorros.
Guam argues that Congress, pursuant to its plenary power under the Territorial
Clause, can treat territories in ways that would otherwise offend the
Constitution.401 Thus, as an instrumentality of Congress and in employing
Congress's "Native Inhabitant" classification, Guam can also limit its political
status plebiscite to a particular group of people, even if based on ancestry.402
In particular, Guam argues that in the unincorporated territories, Congress
can make ancestry-based restrictions "so long as the discriminatory
classification is supported by any conceivable rational basis."o3 Key to Guam's
argument is that the Guam law in question, though a territorial law, was
"enacted in response to a federal measure," Guam's Organic Act.40 4 In Guam's
Organic Act, Congress identified a class of persons-"Native Inhabitants of
Guam"-"to whom it extended citizenship and a limited measure of self-
government, with the understanding that a fuller measure would one day
follow."4 0 5 Because it was enacted in response to that measure, Guam argues
that its law limiting voting in the political status plebiscite should likewise be
subject to rational basis review.4 0 6
Indeed, in some cases from the Pacific Island territories, territorial peoples
have employed the Insular Cases framework as a vehicle for limited self-
determination. In Wabol v. Villacrusis, for example, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Congress's power under the Territorial Clause to shield ancestry-based
restrictions on certain acquisitions of land from the Equal Protection Clause.40 7
Article XII of the constitution of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands "provides that '[t]he acquisition of permanent and long-term interests in
real property within the Commonwealth shall be restricted to persons of
Northern Marianas descent."'40 8 The Ninth Circuit determined that applying the
Equal Protection Clause in this instance would frustrate the interests of both the
" Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000); see Eric K. Yamamoto, The Colonizer's Story: The
Supreme Court Violates Native Hawaiian Sovereignty--Again, COLORLINES (Aug. 20, 2000, 12:00
PM), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/colonizers-story-supreme-court-violates-native-hawaiian-
sovereignty-again (critiquing the Rice decision's distortion of civil rights and twisting of history to
undermine Native Hawaiian self-governance).
401 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 13.
402 Id. at 13-15.
403 Id. at 14.
40 id.
40s Id. at 15.
406 Id.
407 Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
408 Id. at 1452 (alteration in original) (quoting N. MAR. I. CONST. art. XII, § 1).
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people of the Northern Mariana Islands and the United States, as well as threaten
Native culture, property, and social identity:
We think it clear that interposing this constitutional provision
would be both impractical and anomalous in this setting.
Absent the alienation restriction, the political union would not
be possible. . . . For the NMI people, the equalization of access
would be a hollow victory if it led to the loss of their land,
their cultural and social identity, and the benefits of United
States sovereignty. It would truly be anomalous to construe
the equal protection clause to force the United States to break
its pledge to preserve and protect NMI culture and property.
The Bill of Rights was not intended to interfere with the
performance of our international obligations. Nor was it
intended to operate as a genocide pact for diverse native
cultures.409
As Guam contended in its motion for summary judgment, Congress
similarly "saw fit [by way of Guam's Organic Act] to uphold its international
obligations vis-A-vis the island's 'native inhabitants,' guaranteeing them a
limited measure of self-government, with the understanding that the ultimate
expression of self-determination had yet to occur."410 "[Guam's Organic Act]
contribute[s] toward fulfillment of the obligation assumed by the United States
under article 73 of the United Nations Charter to promote the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the non-
self-governing Territories under United States administration."4 11 As such,
Guam argues, its law limiting voting in the political status plebiscite, which
employs the Guam Organic Act's "Native Inhabitant" definition, furthers the
United States' obligation to repair the lasting harms of colonization.4 12
On March 8, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the District of Guam ruled in
Davis's favor.413 The court held "that the Plebiscite statute impermissibly
imposes race-based restrictions on the voting rights of non-Native Inhabitants of
Guam, in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment," and also violates the
Fourteenth Amendment.4 14 The court flatly rejected Guam's Insular Cases
argument because Congress "explicitly extended the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to Guam when it
409 Id. at 1462.
410 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 14, at 17.
41I Id. (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 81-2109 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2840).
412 See id at 9.
41 Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary Judgment, Davis v. Guam, No. 1:11 -cv-00035 (D.
Guam Mar. 8, 2017).
414 Id. at 25.
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enacted the Organic Act of Guam.""5 Guam has appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.416
If Davis ultimately prevails, Guam's commitment to repair historical harms
will be significantly impaired. All voters in Guam-even those not within the
class of intended beneficiaries of the right to decolonization-will be able to
vote in a future political status plebiscite. This result discounts the need to
rectify injustices uniquely suffered by the "Native Inhabitants of Guam"-those
identified in Guam's Organic Act as holding the right to exercise their collective
self-determination through a future decolonization process. This impending
threat to the "Native Inhabitant" vote is particularly critical today, when some
are increasingly calling for independence from the United States to facilitate
Guam's decolonization.4 1 7
Moreover, if the appellate court agrees that "Native Inhabitant" is an
impermissible racial classification, other Chamorro programs are at risk. The
Chamorro Land Trust Act, which requires the Chamorro Land Trust
Commission "to advance the social, cultural and economic development and
well-being of the Chamorro people by way of residential, agricultural and
commercial land distribution and economic assistance programs,""i uses the
same "Native Inhabitants" definition.4 19 If a recently filed lawsuit by the U.S.
Department of Justice420 successfully dismantles this program, as many fear,
Chamorros could lose land being held in trust in part to restore a limited
measure of self-determination.
Similar fears accompanied the U.S. Supreme Court's decision to strike
down a Native Hawaiian-only voting limitation in elections for trustees to the
quasi-state agency, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA), in Rice v.
415 Id.
416 Docketed Cause and Entered Appearances of Counsel, Davis v. Guam, No. 17-15719 (9th Cir.
Apr. 13, 2017).
417 Telephone Interview with Julian Aguon (Feb. 15, 2017); Anna Fifield, Some in Guam Push for




418 About Us, CHAMORRO LAND TR. COMMISSION, http://dlm.guam.gov/chamorro-land-trust-
commission (last visited Sept. 19, 2018).
419 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 75101(d) ("The term Native Chamorro means any person who became a
U.S. citizen by virtue of the authority and enactment of the Organic Act of Guam or descendants of
such person.").
420 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Sues Guam's Government for Racial and
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Cayetano. 421 By characterizing programs for Native Hawaiians as "racial
preferences," Rice not only undermined that Native Hawaiian self-governance
effort, but it "ignite[d] a rash of new 'civil rights' lawsuits to dismantle
Hawaiian health care, education, housing, and cultural programs."42 2 In the 2016
election, a conservative Native Hawaiian, who is opposed to the OHA's support
of Native Hawaiian programs, won a seat as an OHA trustee by appealing to
non-Native Hawaiian voters who gained the right to vote in Rice.423
Thus, Chamorro attempts to deploy the Insular Cases framework as a shield
against reverse discrimination attacks and "to fight for liberation"42 4 have urgent
and far-reaching consequences. The outcome will impact not only the Davis
case, but ongoing Chamorro efforts to support their material and cultural needs
and heal persisting wounds of U.S. colonization.
4. Segovia v. Board ofElection Commissioners
Segovia v. Board of Election Commissioners reveals the Insular Cases'
constriction of territorial peoples' rights to participation in the larger U.S. polity.
Six U.S. citizens who are former residents of Illinois and who now reside in
Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands challenged the constitutionality
of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA). 425
They claimed that UOCAVA violates their rights to equal protection and due
process because it bars them from casting Illinois absentee ballots in federal
elections now that they reside in those three territories.4 26 In contrast, U.S.
citizens who are former Illinois residents can cast Illinois absentee ballots if they
move to the Northern Mariana Islands, American Samoa (pursuant to the Illinois
Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act), or a foreign country.427 The
plaintiffs argued that UOCAVA's "selective enfranchisement" of absentee
421 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000). The OHA was created by state constitutional
amendment o promote Native Hawaiian self-determination through programs and advocacy efforts,
and to "[s]erv[e] as a receptacle for reparations." HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-3.
422 Yamamoto & Corpus Betts, supra note 254, at 545.
423 Rick Daysog, Newly-Elected OHA Trustee Wants to Cut Funding to Sovereignty Programs,
HAWAll NEWS Now (Nov. 9, 2016, 9:32 PM), http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/33674
033/ohas-newest-trustee-opposes-native-hawaiian-sovereignty (reporting that political analysts
predict increases in non-Native Hawaiian voter scrutiny of the OHA).
424 Julian Aguon, counsel for Guam, commented that by using the Insular Cases in this fashion he is
"deploying the anti-canon to fight for liberation. It's counterintuitive, but brilliant and imaginative."
Telephone Interview with Julian Aguon (Sept. 16, 2016).
425 Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 201 F. Supp. 3d 924, 928 (N.D. 111. 2016); see Uniformed
and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20310 (2012).
426 Complaint at 20, Segovia, 201 F. Supp. 3d 924 (No. 15-cv-10196). Plaintiffs also alleged that the
Illinois Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (Illinois MOVE) violated their equal
protection and due process rights to interstate travel. Id.; see Illinois Military and Overseas Voter
Empowerment Act, 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/20-1 (2015).
427 Segovia, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
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voters in the Northern Mariana Islands deprives absentee voters in Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands of the fundamental right to vote.428
Pursuant to UOCAVA, "State" refers to a U.S. State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
American Samoa.429 An "overseas voter" is "a person who resides outside the
United States and is qualified to vote in the last place in which the person was
domiciled before leaving the United States."430 Since Puerto Rico, Guam, the
U.S. Virgin Islands, and American Samoa are considered "States," the Segovia
plaintiffs under UOCAVA are not "overseas voters."431
In 2016, Judge Gottschall of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.432 The court acknowledged the anomalous
situation faced by many territorial residents in part rooted in the Insular Cases:
"[T]he current voting situation in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands is at least in part grounded on the Insular Cases, which have been
described as 'establish[ing] a less-than-complete application of the Constitution
in some U.S. territories,' based on explicitly racist views . . . ."433
However, the court ruled that "under the rational basis standard, the
challenged provisions of the UOCAVA are constitutional."43 4 The right to vote
is "fundamental," stated the court, but only for "citizens of a state."435 in
contrast, territorial residents do not have a constitutional right to vote in federal
elections, and "[w]ithout a constitutional right, there can be no fundamental
right." 4 36 "This is critical," noted the court, "as only '[t]he guaranties of certain
fundamental personal rights declared in the Constitution' apply to the
territories." 4 37 Because U.S. citizens residing in territories do not have a
fundamental right to vote, "the fact that the individual plaintiffs are United
States citizens who used to be able to vote in Illinois does not mean that they
428 Id. at 939.
429 Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20310(6) (2012).
430 Id. § 20310(5)(B).
431 Segovia, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 932.
432 
Id. at 951.
433 Id. at 938 (quoting Paeste v. Gov't of Guam, 798 F.3d 1228, 1231 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015)). Citing to
the works of judges Jos6 Trias Monge and Juan Torruella, Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, and
Senator Elizabeth Warren's Facebook page, the court acknowledged the extensive criticism leveled
against "[t]he inconsistencies between the constitutional rights afforded to United States citizens
living in states as opposed to territories." Id. at 938-39.
434 Id. at 929.
435 Id. at 940.
436 Segovia, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 940-41.
437 Id. at 941 (alteration in original) (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922)).
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retain their fundamental right to vote when they move from Illinois to Puerto
Rico, Guam, or the U.S. Virgin Islands."438
The court acknowledged that UOCAVA treats voters who now reside in the
Northern Mariana Islands differently than those who now reside in Puerto Rico,
Guam, or the U.S. Virgin Islands, but because Congress has wide latitude to
make rules and regulations respecting the territories, UOCAVA's distinction
between U.S. territories does not trigger strict scrutiny review.439 instead,
Congress rationally treated the Northern Mariana Islands differently than the
other territories.440 As such, the court held that UOCAVA's exclusion of the
Northern Mariana Islands from the definition of "State" was rational."' The
plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.442
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the lower court erred in improperly
expanding the now-discredited Insular Cases to hold that the right to vote is not
"fundamental" in the territories."3 They contended, among other things, that
"[t]he district court's conclusion . . . -that heightened scrutiny never applies to
the statutory extension of voting rights to new groups of individuals who are not
constitutionally secured such rights-is a misapplication of equal-protection
jurisprudence."44 Instead, "[w]hen Congress or the states extend voting rights
beyond the scope mandated by the Constitution," as Congress did with
UOCAVA, "that extension must satisfy heightened scrutiny when it excludes
some citizens from voting, regardless of whether those voters would have a
constitutional right to vote absent that legislative action." 5
Segovia is one of many lawsuits in which territorial residents have fought to
secure the right to more fully participate in U.S. democracy. Territorial peoples
have advanced both constitutional and international law arguments to obtain the
4
1s Id. at 942.
439 Id. at 945.
440 Id. at 945-49 (noting, among other things, that UOCAVA was enacted before the Northern
Mariana Islands became a U.S. territory; the Northern Mariana Islands used to be a Pacific Trust
Territory, for which the United States was trustee; and the Northern Mariana Islands hold a right to
self-government under the Covenant that the other territories do not possess).
" Id. at 950. A few months later, the district court held that Illinois MOVE did not violate the
plaintiffs' equal protection rights, and that UOCAVA and Illinois MOVE did not violate the
plaintiffs' due process rights to interstate travel. Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 218 F. Supp.
3d 643, 645-46 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
442 Segovia v. United States, supra note 18.
44 Brief of Appellants at 13-14, 26, Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 2018) (No. 16-
4240).
44
4 Id. at 14.
4s Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
UOCAVA because it does not prevent Illinois from providing the plaintiffs with absentee ballots and
affirmed the district court's ruling that Illinois MOVE does not violate equal protection or the due
process right to interstate travel. Segovia, 880 F.3d at 392.
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right to vote in U.S. presidential elections." Courts have held that the denial of
the right to vote in such elections to territorial residents does not offend the U.S.
Constitution, and neither international treaties nor customary international law
obligate the United States to grant territorial peoples the right to vote."7 Thus,
territorial residents are subject to the plenary power of the United States, but
have very little power to participate in the government that controls them.
Indeed, as Judge Torruella noted in Igartia-de la Rosa v. United States, "[n]o
effective political pressure can be exercised by the subjects of this colonial
relationship on the national political institutions with power to solve the
problem.""8 This effectively insulates the United States from the transformative
political pressures that could force it to repair centuries of colonization in the
unincorporated territories.
B. Some Thoughts About Incorporating the Insular Cases into Law School
Courses from the Perspective of the Bottom
As described above, the Insular Cases ought to be taught because over one
hundred years after the cases were decided, they have unacknowledged yet real
impacts on the self-determination of those colonized. But how might one begin
to think about incorporating Downes v. Bidwell or other questions raised by the
Insular Cases into existing courses? Painting in broad strokes, this Section
suggests some ways to begin thinking about how to do so. Some courses that
focus specifically on U.S. territories and U.S. colonization of course spend
considerable time on the Insular Cases, but others, such as constitutional law,
can incorporate questions raised by the Insular Cases as well.
In some instances, it may be easier to teach the Insular Cases "from the
bottom" than in others. For example, because of the nature of courses such as
Race and Law, looking to the bottom-and, specifically, to the self-
determination efforts of those most oppressed-is intrinsic to the way that type
of course is taught.4 49 On the other hand, a Federal Courts class considers more
broadly the institutional design of the federal system and may not as easily lend
itself to a program of study focused on self-determination.450 However, I
contend that at least Downes v. Bidwell and its lasting influence and impacts can
and should be taught in a much wider range of courses than currently cover
these crucial issues.
446 See Igartda-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d
118 (2d Cir. 2001); Att'y Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984).
' See, e.g., Igartzia-de la Rosa, 417 F.3d at 152.
"' Id. at 168 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
"4 See, e.g., PEREA ET AL., supra note 31; Malavet, supra note 58.
450 See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 41, at 265 n.90 (describing Helen Hershkoffs Federal Courts
class, in which she "enlist[s] the insular cases in teaching a number of topics, including
Congressional control of jurisdiction; the establishment of Article I courts and agency structure; and
the relation between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and structural protections").
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According to most faculty I contacted, constitutional law is the most
common and seemingly appropriate course in which to incorporate the Insular
Cases. 45 1 For example, a discussion of Downes could appropriately illustrate
issues of congressional power within the context of a larger separation of powers
discussion. It could also fall fittingly into a discussion of the development of the
United States' national identity and the evolution of early constitutional
decision-making. For example, as Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking
demonstrates, Downes sets an important foundation for examining the creation
of our "American Nation."'52 As the casebook illustrates, alongside cases and
issues involving the Reconstruction Amendments, such as the Slaughterhouse
Cases and Plessy v. Ferguson; early immigration cases like Chae Chan Ping v.
United States; religious diversity cases, such as Reynolds v. United States; and
other cases involving congressional powers, Downes sheds important light on
the law's treatment of those peripheral to the U.S. polity.453 In other words, it
underscores decision-makers' attempts to expand the United States' reach
without embracing new and different peoples-even as those decision-makers
were grappling with how to handle groups of color already present in the United
States.415 4 Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking groups such cases and
questions into a chapter entitled "From Reconstruction to the New Deal: 1866-
1934 ."455
Downes therefore demands examination of the important questions of
imperial expansion, Congress's power to exercise jurisdiction "outside" of the
United States (and the limitations on that power), and the impacts on the
territorial peoples who were (and still are) the objects of that power. For
example, Constitutional Law briefly queries in its "Separation of Powers"
chapter whether "the Constitution follow[s] the flag" and whether the U.S.
government was "bound by the Constitution when it exercise[d] jurisdiction
outside of the United States."4156 U.S. National Security Law similarly excerpts
one of the Insular Cases, Dorr v. United States, to illustrate the extraterritorial
reach of the Constitution.4 5 7 Not only were these questions of congressional
power of great public importance and legal significance at the time, but they also
impacted-and continue to impact-the self-determination efforts of a vast
number of territorial peoples.
Similarly, in a Race and Law or Critical Race Theory course, discussion of
Downes and the impacts of American expansionism on racialized communities
451 Four law faculty noted that they currently include or used to include the Insular Cases in their
constitutional law courses or would include them if they were to teach constitutional law..
452 BREST ET AL., supra note 29, at 444.
453 Id. at 373-471.
454 See id.
455 Id. at 347.
456 SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 144, at 421.
457 FRANCK ET AL., supra note 147, at 1121-25.
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is crucial. Downes prompts questions such as those found in Latinos and the
Law: "What exactly makes it valid for Congress to decide what parts of the
Constitution apply to conquered territory? Doesn't the principle of enumerated
powers make Congress subject to the Constitution always?"" At the same time,
Downes and its surrounding context provide ample opportunity to discuss both
the historical and present-day impacts on the self-determination of territorial
peoples-one could analyze the Insular Cases' racialized language in the
context of the expansionist ideology of the time; the history of U.S. dominion
over the territories, as part of the line of cases authorizing conquest"9 ; the
propriety of denying certain constitutional rights to peoples of unincorporated
territories; the concrete and ongoing impacts on diverse groups and cultures
from the Caribbean to the Pacific; and the proactive ways in which territorial
peoples continue to advocate for both the civil rights of inclusion and full self-
determination as autonomous peoples. For example, the application of the
Insular Cases in Tuaua v. United States complicates the understanding of
birthright citizenship,460 a key topic of discussion in an Asian Americans and the
Law course.461
The cases that arose following the Insular Cases-in which U.S. courts held
that territorial peoples are not entitled to the same level of federal benefits as
residents of the states462 and do not have the right to vote in U.S. presidential
elections46 3--Compel students to consider the application of the Equal Protection
Clause to territorial peoples. For example, Race and Races requires students to
consider the permissive rational basis standard used to review Congress's
unequal treatment of Puerto Ricans, asking, "How can Congress treat an entire
group of people defined by Puerto Rican ancestry less generously and
differently from other Americans?",46 It queries whether Congress should
reconsider territorial peoples' exclusion from the voting booth and from federal
benefit programs, then invites students to consider why Congress has not yet
done so.465 In contrast, the Insular Cases and their modem-day incarnations
458 DELGADO ET AL., supra note 31, at 60; see PEREA ET AL., supra note 31, at 354.
459 E-mail from Juan Perea, Professor of Law, Loyola Univ. Chi. Sch. of Law, to Susan Serrano
(Feb. 24, 2017, 7:56 AM HST) (on file with author) (noting that he teaches Downes in this context).
460 See Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
461 See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898) (holding that children born
of Chinese foreign nationals, domiciled and residing in the United States, are entitled to birthright
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment).
462 See Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980); Califano v. Gautier Torres, 435 U.S. I (1978).
463 See Igarta-de la Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005); Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d
118 (2d Cir. 2001); Att'y Gen. of Guam v. United States, 738 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1984).
464 PEREA ET AL., supra note 31, at 367.
465 Id. Similarly, in the context of "The Right to Participate," the notes and questions in The Law of
Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process do not excerpt any of the Insular Cases but
highlight U.S. imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, connecting it to the
present-day denial of the right to vote to Puerto Ricans. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCEss 42 (5th ed. 2016). Also, in the notes
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raise compelling questions about some Indigenous peoples' desire to stave off
the regressive application of the Equal Protection Clause in the territories in
order to shield Native traditions and practices from constitutional attack.466
Using casebooks such as these, along with many other books and
resources,467 the Insular Cases have been or are being taught in classes such as
United States Territorial Possessions4 6 8 ; Pacific Island Legal Systems469 ; The
Constitution and American Expansion470 ; Hispanics, Civil Rights and the
Law 4 7 1; and Critical Race Studies,472 among others.473 Additionally, at least a
and questions in a section on "The Right to Vote," Comparative Constitutionalism: Cases and
Materials briefly connects Puerto Ricans' lack of voting rights to Balzac v. Porto Rico and Igartda-
de la Rosa. NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS
1539-40 (3d ed. 2016). In addition, a section on "Voting Rights and Electoral Participation" in
Racial Justice and Law does not include the Insular Cases, but excerpts Igartda-de la Rosa and
underscores the interplay of voting rights, political status, race, American imperialism, and
democratic principles. BANKS ET AL., supra note 151, at 933-38.
466 See discussion supra Sections V.A.2, V.A.3.
467 See, e.g., RIVERA RAMOS, supra note 62; PEDRO A. MALAVET, AMERICA'S COLONY: THE
POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO Rico (2004);
ROMAN, supra note 125; FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO Rico, AMERICAN EXPANSION,
AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 82; RECONSIDERING THE INSULAR CASES: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE (Gerald L. Neuman & Tomiko Brown-Nagin eds., 2015);
LEIBOWITZ, supra note 46.
468 Pedro A. Malavet, Seminar: United States Territorial Possessions, U. FLA. LEVIN C.L.,
http://nersp.osg.ufl.edu/-malavet/seminar/territoriesmain.htm (last updated July 30, 2012) (using
MALAVET, supra note 467, and excerpts from LEIBOWITZ, supra note 46, to explore "the history of
U.S. territorial acquisitions and the changing legal paradigms applied by the United States to its past
and current territorial possessions").
469 Syllabus, Susan K. Serrano & Julian Aguon, Pacific Island Legal Systems (LWPA 594) (Spring
2016) (on file with author).
470 Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon of Constitutional Law, in FOREIGN
IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICo, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
82, at 121, 124 (describing his "The Constitution and American Expansion" seminar); see E-mail
from Christina Duffy Ponsa, Professor of Legal History, Columbia Law Sch., to Susan Serrano (June
3, 2017, 5:44 AM HST) (on file with author) (noting that she teaches the Insular Cases to first-year
law students).
471 E-mail from Marc-Tizoc GonzAlez, Assoc. Professor of Law, St. Thomas Sch. of Law, to Susan
Serrano (Feb. 18, 2017, 7:15 AM HST) (on file with author) (explaining that his Hispanics, Civil
Rights and the Law course "features several of the Insular Cases" and noting that when he teaches
the course, he "find[s] particularly strong resonance between the Insular Cases and Johnson v.
M'Intosh); Syllabus, Marc-Tizoc Gonzalez, Hispanics, Civil Rights and the Law (Law 899L3)
(Spring 2017) (on file with author) (including the Treaty of Paris, Downes v. Bidwell, the Jones Act,
and Balzac v. Porto Rico in a segment on "Legal Statuses, Cultures, Histories, and Identities of
Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans"); see Syllabus, Charles R. Venator-Santiago, Puerto Rican
Politics and Culture (POLS 3667) (Spring 2017) (on file with author); Syllabus, Charles R. Venator-
Santiago, United States Territorial Law and Politics (POLS 2998) (Spring 2017) (on file with
author).
472 E-mail from Juan Perea, supra note 459 (noting that he teaches Downes in his Critical Race
Studies class).
17 E.g., Syllabus, Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi, Seminar on the Constitutional and Historical
Development of United States Territories: 1898-Present (Summer 2018) (on file with author).
454 [21:2018]
Elevating the Perspectives of US. Territorial Peoples
passing mention of the Insular Cases appears in casebooks on national security
law, conflicts of law, immigration law and policy, and American Indian law.474
In many of these courses, one could also examine the concept of "fundamental"
rights as applied to U.S. territorial peoples. As discussed above, while
"fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights" are guaranteed to those
residing in the U.S. territories, rights deemed non-fundamental are not.475
"Fundamental" rights are those "so basic as to be integral to free and fair
society." 476 In contrast, "non-fundamental" rights are "those artificial,
procedural, or remedial rights that . . . are nonetheless idiosyncratic to the
American social compact or to the Anglo-American tradition of
jurisprudence."'7 7 According to this framework, even revered rights to equal
protection are not fundamental in some territories.4 78 This seemingly puzzling
result provides the opportunity to explore the differences between the concept of
"fundamental" rights as it applies in the states versus the territories, as well as
the conflicts between, on the one hand, Indigenous groups' attempts to maintain
tradition and, on the other, the application of concepts of equality and anti-
discrimination in the territories.
In our Pacific Island Legal Systems class, Julian Aguon and I use the
Insular Cases (in conjunction with international law governing the
decolonization of dependent territories) to analyze the multifaceted development
of Pacific Island legal systems and those islands' relationships with the United
States. The students read key scholarly commentaries on the Insular Cases
alongside the various territories' constitutions, statutes, case law, legal briefs,
and news articles highlighting the Insular Cases' impacts on the self-
determination efforts of the specific communities. Students thus increase their
knowledge of the substantive laws of these jurisdictions while deepening their
awareness of the larger legal systems in which these regional self-determination
struggles have operated, as well as the impacts of the Insular Cases on those
struggles.
Thus, the Insular Cases are a way to expand students' understanding of
self-determination as more than just a concept that derives from U.N.
instruments. It is a concept that speaks to repairing harms that require for
remediation more than money or words or return of land. To repair these long-
standing injustices is to respond to groups' self-determined ideas about injury
and remedy.
Of course, many cases, areas of law, and legal questions compete for a place
in law school courses, particularly in constitutional law. Law faculty are
continually faced with skipping over several sections of casebooks or cutting
474 See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
4 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300, 307 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
476
Id. at 308.
4 7 8See Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1990).
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focus areas.47 9 Indeed, one could argue that cases regarding slavery, early
immigration, federal Indian law, and many others should be added to the
curriculum as well. As Levinson contends, slavery-related cases are arguably
just as important to cover as Downes in a constitutional law course because of
slavery's impact on the formation of the United States as a nation.480 However,
as he observes, several historical cases may have been important in their time
but have little impact today, while the impact of the Insular Cases is "a live
issue of American politics and constitutional inquiry.' " As Race and Races
notes, the U.S. Supreme Court's "discussion of the status of Puerto Rico and its
relationship to the United States had, and continues to have, enormous
significance.""82
VI. CONCLUSION
"Virgin Islanders are required to follow federal laws, [so] shouldn't we
have a say in making those laws?" queried Pamela Colon, a U.S. Virgin Islands
resident and plaintiff in Segovia v. Board of Election Commissioners.4 83 [W]il
the people of Guam ever be permitted to exercise their inalienable right to
determine for themselves their ultimate relationship with the United States and
their political status among the community of nations?" asked Joaquin Perez, a
resident of Guam.484 Their pleas echo Puerto Rican resident Erika Rodriguez's
lament quoted at the start of this Article-residents of the unincorporated
territories "have no voice." 485 Their powerlessness to influence national
decisions that impact them underscores the lasting colonial relationship between
the unincorporated territories and the United States.
The modem-day legal controversies impacting four million territorial
people, described above, are nearly invisible to most Americans-and to most
law students. The Insular Cases that dictate the results in those controversies are
rarely considered, except in a few limited circumstances.486 Most law school
479 Another challenge in incorporating the Insular Cases into existing classes is the political climate
at a particular law school.
480 See Levinson, supra note 41, at 244 n.10.
481 Id.
4.. PEREA ET AL., supra note 31, at 349; see Malavet, supra note 46, at 254-55 (noting that Downes
is a "living constitutional doctrine and it daily affects the lives of millions of our citizens by creating
an underclass of citizenship and United States territory in a permanent state of constitutional
uncertainty about its future").
4 It May Take a Constitutional Amendment Before USVI Residents Can Vote for President, Justice
Sotomayor Says, V.I. CONSORTIUM (Feb. 9, 2017), http://viconsortium.com/featured/it-may-take-a-
constitutional-amendment-before-usvi-residents-can-vote-for-president-justice-sotomayor-says
(quoting Pamela Colon).
484 Joaquin P. Perez, Perez: Military a Barrier to Guam 's Self-Determination, PAC. DAILY NEWS
(Mar. 5, 2016, 8:30 PM), http://www.guampdn.com/story/opinion/2016/03/05/perez-military-
barrier-guams-self-determination/81306672.
485 Navarro, supra note I (quoting Puerto Rican resident Erika P. Rodriguez).
486 See discussion supra Section III.A.
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courses do not include them, and most casebooks omit meaningful coverage of
them.487 As seen in the recent cases impacting Puerto Ricans,48 8 American
Samoans,48 9 Chamorus of Guam,490 and the voting rights of U.S. citizens
residing in Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,491 the Insular Cases
and the United States' colonial control over the territories continue to have
monumental, yet largely unacknowledged, impacts on territorial peoples' self-
determination.
For example, Guam is now bracing for a U.S. military buildup slated for
2022 that some fear will trigger a "demographic change in the makeup of the
island that . . . will result in the political dispossession of the Chamoru
people."492 The buildup proposes doubling the size of the current U.S. military
presence from 6,000 to 11,000, plus 1,300 dependents, the acquisition of land,
and the construction of training facilitieS49 3-to add to the twenty-eight percent
of the island already occupied by the U.S. military.4 94 Because of its colonial
status, rooted in part in the Insular Cases, the United States can treat Guam as
"America's unsinkable aircraft carrier'495 and do what it pleases with Guam's
land.496 But Chamorus and other Guam residents are mobilizing to protest
militarization, call for changes to Guam's political status, and demand that
487 In 2000, constitutional aw scholar Sanford Levinson "encourage[d] the welcoming of Downes
and linked materials into the various canons of American constitutional inquiry." Levinson, supra
note 41, at 266. Since then, it appears that more law faculty have incorporated some mention of the
Insular Cases into casebooks and courses, but more is needed to shine light on territorial peoples'
efforts to restore a measure of self-governance, particularly in light of the humanitarian crises in
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands and the escalating threat of nuclear war in G- 3m. See
Nichols, supra note 6; Aguon, supra note 7.
488 Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016); Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr.,
136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
489 Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
4 Davis v. Guam, 785 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 2015).
49 Segovia v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 201 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
492 Aguon, supra note 222, at 67.
4 Tiara R. Na'puti & Michael Lujan Bevacqua, Militarization and Resistance from Gudhan:
Protecting and Defending Pcgat, 67 AM. Q. 837, 845 (2015); Jon Letman, Proposed US Military
Buildup on Guam Angers Locals Who Liken It to Colonization, GUARDIAN (Aug. 1, 2016, 9:43 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/0 I/guam-us-military-marines-deployment.
494 Letman, supra note 493 (reporting that Guam houses a drove of bombers, fast-attack nuclear
submarines, supersonic aircraft, an expeditionary helicopter squadron, a Naval Ordnance Annex, a
terminal high-altitude area defense missile defense battery, Joint Region Marianas headquarters,
Andersen air force base, Naval Base Guam, and "a 984,000-square-mile testing and live-fire training
area"); see Perez, supra note 484.
495 Fifield, supra note 417; Emma Reynolds, 'America's Best-Kept Secret': The People with US
Passports But No Vote, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 7, 2016, 8:53 AM), http://www.news.com.au/world/
asia/americas-bestkept-secret-the-people-with-us-passports-but-no-vote/news-story/a5929ff7e93e9fc
38e6994e0d7b86901.
496 See Fifield, supra note 417; Aguon, supra note 137, at 141-42.
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Chamorus "be permitted to exercise their right to political self-
determination."497
This Article has argued that the Insular Cases, and possibly their
contemporary incarnations, should be taught in law school because they are
valuable for revealing the perspective of those most affected by them.498
Looking to those at the bottom in the context of colonized peoples is most
powerful when linked to the significant international human rights norm of self-
determination.4 99 Self-determination entails repairing the damage suffered by
those who have experienced systemic oppression according to their self-shaped
notions of reparation."oo As described above, we can grasp a key aspect of the
meaning of self-determination for territorial peoples by examining their present-
day usages of or resistance to the teachings of the Insular Cases.
In Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the
Northern Mariana Islands, peoples are engaging the Insular Cases in strategic
and disparate ways. They are using approaches that are both defensive against
further encroachment on self-governance efforts and proactively assertive as the
foundation for repairing decades of social and political damage. They are pairing
these approaches with community organizing, public education, media
storytelling, and scholarly writing to tell the history of the United States'
relationship with their lands, and highlighting group harms and the need for
repair. Although Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Guam now garner
increased media attention-largely in the context of massive hurricanes or
nuclear war-the territories' political invisibility lingers. Learning about the
Insular Cases from the bottom-their past impacts and present deployment-
will thus open law students' eyes to the important interplay between the cases'
doctrine and the self-determination efforts of those colonized.
497 LisaLinda Natividad & Victoria-Lola Leon Guerrero, The Explosive Growth of U.S. Military
Power on Guam Confronts People Power: Experience of an Island People Under Spanish, Japanese
and American Colonial Rule, ASIA-PAC. J., Dec. 6, 2010, at 1, 14.
498 See Matsuda, supra note 27, at 324-25.
499 See supra Part IV.
50 See Tsosie, supra note 37, at 245.
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